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## **Study on the first phase of the 100-Day Employment Generation Programme**

10/02/09

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In September 2008, the Government of Bangladesh embarked on the first phase of a 100-day Employment Generation Programme (EGP) for the poorest and jobless poor. This endeavour came in response to the soaring food price. NFPCSP was requested by the Government to assist in the appraisal of the programme through an evaluation of its first phase and the preparation for the assessment of the impact of the entire programme.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The review of the design entailed an assessment of the objectives and design of the programme, mainly based on the analysis of the Implementation Guidelines produced by the Government. Interviews with a selected number of government officials at Ministry and district levels were also needed to understand implementation processes. Another source of information was a nationally representative survey carried out especially for this study. Extensive in-depth qualitative research was also undertaken at field level.

## **BACKGROUND**

In a context where access to food by many low income, poor and extreme poor people was challenged because of the price hike of essential commodities, the strategy of the Government has been to scale-up existing food-based safety net programs both in terms of coverage and benefits, and to introduce additional targeted schemes including the 100-Day EGP. This programme's intended focus and design finds a strong rationale in the unemployment, food insecurity and poverty context of Bangladesh. The EGP represents a significant effort towards expanding coverage of employment generation-focused safety nets. With an estimated outreach to two million households or about 10 million beneficiaries and with the objective of generating 200 million person days of employment per year, the EGP is the largest Government safety net programme focused on employment generation. It distinguishes itself from others not only by its scale, but also by its intended focus on the extreme poor and the unemployed poor. It is in line with the main policy frameworks dealing with poverty and food security such as the National Food Policy (2006) and the National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (2008).

## **ASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION**

### ***Preparation of the programme***

Because this programme was devised in response to an emergency situation arising from the hike in food prices, the Government was confronted with a trade-off between acting fast to relieve the suffering of the poor and taking adequate time to prepare the launch of this significant programme. Thus, a recurrent issue that arose at all levels of implementation was the lack of adequate preparation and guidance before initiating the programme.

### ***Beneficiary selection***

A brief review of the beneficiary selection criteria uncovered elements of inconsistency between the different criteria listed in the Implementation Guidelines as well as between the criteria defined and the objectives set for the programme which reveals, to a certain extent, that too many target groups and issues were intended to be addressed with a single program. In its attempt to focus the programme on the poorest of the country, the program calculated the number of cards to be allocated by upazila using poverty map established by a 2004 study by the Government of Bangladesh in collaboration with the World Food Programme. This method of allocation led to an outcome where total cards allocated per district/upazila amounted to 5% of the extreme poor in each. Although equitable from a national perspective, this is not consistent with the priority set by the Guidelines of putting emphasis on the most vulnerable areas of the country (flood affected, *monga* prone, *haor baor* and *char* areas). The programme does not seem to have been able fulfill its other objective either: tackling seasonal unemployment.

As regards the beneficiary identification process, the intention of the Government was to leave the responsibility of selecting the beneficiaries to the community -albeit to the influential members of the community. A number of in-built mechanisms were put in place to try and ensure that the right people were targeted. Although the involvement of a number of people and consultations with relevant individuals was foreseen in the Guidelines, in several cases, the UP Chairman or members did not consult anyone else in deciding who should be on the list. In depth interviews revealed a preference towards known people in the selection process and this was confirmed by the survey. Interviews with district, upazila and union level Government officials also revealed that the official criteria for selection of beneficiaries had not always been clearly understood and in some cases were not even known.

Results from the survey show that beneficiaries were significantly more likely to be poor than non beneficiaries. On the whole, the age range officially set (18-50) was respected in the listing of beneficiaries but in practice, some adjustments were made. On the whole, the provision excluding individuals benefiting from other safety nets was followed. Paradoxically, it seems the rule was more strictly applied to the poorest section of the population.

Without any administrative gender requirements, 28% of the beneficiaries in the first phase of the 100-day EGP turned out to be women which translates a strong need and demand by women to participate in such a programme. For many of these beneficiary women, this programme turned out to be more than relief from temporary unemployment: it provided them an employment opportunity for the first time in their life.

#### ***Targeting effectiveness***

About 37% of the beneficiaries were from the poorest 20% of the population. 67% of the benefits were captured by the poorest 40% of the population. Gross mistargeting occurred for 2.2% of the beneficiaries which belonged to the richest 20% of the population. While safety nets of a similar nature (e.g. IGVGD) are incontestably much better at reaching the poorest group, the 100-Day EGP is compared to them in terms of its outreach to the poor (as opposed to the extreme poor). This relatively low outreach to the extreme poor may be explained by a situation where little guidance and tools were given to field level officials as to how to identify the extreme poor and where even the Implementation Guidelines were unclear as to whether *only* the extreme poor should be targeted. Although the focus on the extreme poor was limited, the food security levels of beneficiaries were found to be significantly lower than that of the non participants.

#### ***Selection of works***

As for the beneficiaries, the list of works to be undertaken in the duration of the project was finalised by the end of August 2008. Close to 160,000 works were identified. Again, in the Guidelines, a lot was left to the community level authorities to decide, in an attempt to ensure local conditions were taken into account. In practice, only in some cases was the selection of works done in consultation with relevant local experts. Overall, the selection process was rather *ad hoc* and not part of an integrated local development planning as is the practice in the Indian NREGS for instance. Interestingly, in a number of areas, large scale road constructions were favoured over smaller projects such as heap compost making, as it had been understood that projects undertaken should last 100 days.

In deciding to carry out the programme at a national scale between September to end of November, the uniformity of the lean season throughout the country was assumed, albeit with some scope for flexibility with a 15 day option to delay the start of the programme. The result of this is that in some areas, due to agro ecological characteristics, works could not be started within the timeframe foreseen and the works could not be completed by the end of the first phase of the programme. This late start has meant that on average, less than 60 days' work was in fact provided to the beneficiaries.

### ***Fund release***

Although the allocation of such a large amount of funds throughout the country could have been problematic, the Government opted to use a system which has been operational in other programmes. This procedure ensures all steps are checked by a higher authority to minimise leakage opportunities. Because the system tried to minimise the opportunities for misuse of funds, the transactions costs involved were substantial. In particular, the fact that every single daily payment of the benefit involves a form to be signed by six officials mobilises immense resources. The fieldwork also revealed that often, the amount to be received by the upazila authorities towards the administration of the programme had only been received in early November, affecting the logistics and supervision of the work. The flat rate applied for all upazilas was questioned because some areas had to manage many more beneficiaries than others. In practice, only one district distributed the unemployment benefit. The in depth-study carried out revealed a pervasive lack of understanding of how this benefit should function.

### ***Monitoring***

The monitoring of the programme as per the Guidelines involves a substantial number of actors at all levels and is quite complex in the linkages that exist between them. At times, this may have translated into over burdened systems which have difficulty in functioning or which have ended up diverging from the Guidelines to adapt to the realities of the field. Also, there seems to have been duplication of effort in the production of the Daily Achievement Report. As regards this Report, an important part of it seemed redundant after a few days of beginning the programme and would be more suited to a weekly/monthly report. Other inefficiencies were observed such as the lack of use of Information and Communication Technologies. One clear remark based on field observations was that monitoring activities monopolised a great amount of human resources, not always matched by the financial resources available. This reported deficiency in resources was exacerbated by the delay in the receipt of the allocated amounts towards administrative costs and heavily constrained supervision and monitoring of the field project works.

### ***Accountability mechanisms and transparency***

The lack of adequate preparation for the 100-Day EGP not only affected those implementing the programme at the field level but also the potential beneficiaries: unaware of the official criteria on which the selection of beneficiaries would be based, it was difficult for anyone to challenge the decisions taken. While many thought to complain, they were unsure as to how to go about it. Because of the design of the programme which covers 5% of the extreme poor in each region, by definition, eligible people will be excluded, with inevitable disgruntlement by those left out. Given this, many people were likely to complain. Nevertheless, the issue of grievances was taken very seriously at the Ministry level and Upazila Nirbahi Officer were advised to follow all complaints by an enquiry signalling the Governments intention to maximize transparency of the procedures. However, the in-depth qualitative study gathered information on a number of irregularities for which, even though attempts were made to complain, no grievance was recorded. Other efforts towards ensuring transparency were made (albeit late) with the posting of the Implementation Guidelines on the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management website. Following the end of the first phase, the final Achievement Report was also posted there.

### **PROGRAMME IMPACTS AS PERCEIVED BY BENEFICIARIES**

Results on the initial perceived impact of the programme are very encouraging: more than three-fourths of the participants reported an improvement in their overall economic condition thanks to the programme. 77% of participant households reported an improvement in their food consumption, either in terms of quality, or quantity, or both. Investment in household assets – both productive and non productive- thanks to the programme was reported for some and plans were being made for the future. There was a general consensus among beneficiaries that the programme should continue. For many, joining this programme had allowed them not

to migrate to find employment. This programme was often preferred to safety net programmes not requiring work as the dignity and respect that came from earning income through work outweighed the benefits of charity in the eyes of the beneficiaries. The programme was particularly helpful to women who often, unlike men, are unable to migrate for better work opportunities. This calls for more focussed targeting of women and addressing the gender constraints that women face in participating in labour market. Social impact was also reported, in particular related to conflicts that arose between those competing to become beneficiaries.

#### **CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINE TUNING THE PROGRAM DESIGN AND ENHANCING IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE SECOND PHASE**

The outcome of the first phase of this programme is encouraging with a majority of beneficiaries, notably women, reporting positive impacts that included long term impacts such as investment in productive assets. The media have been very positive with some newspapers reporting no *monga* this year in some typically *monga*-prone areas. The programme has been only relatively successful in targeting the extreme poor which, in part, may be explained by some confusion over the selection criteria and little preparation of the field officials. The outreach to the poor (as opposed to the extreme poor) is reasonably good however, and compares to that of other similar safety net programmes.

As expected with a programme of this scale, the programme suffered some weaknesses, as described throughout this report. In the conclusion of the main report, recommendations are split into those that may be taken into account for implementation in the run up to the second phase of the programme, and those that may be considered if the programme is to be repeated in the future.

#### **Short term recommendations are:**

##### **Preparation**

1. The Government may consider producing a leaflet or booklet responding to 'Frequently Asked Questions' in order to clarify doubts that the general population and field-level officials may still have on objectives and modalities of the programme. The document(s) may be widely circulated on paper and through the internet.
2. Workshops may be organised at the field level to raise awareness on the programme of the general population and discuss implementation issues with the government officers involved.

##### **Objectives of the programme and intended beneficiaries**

3. To the extent possible given the short time left before the beginning of the second phase of the programme, the list of beneficiaries may be purged from the obvious inclusion errors i.e. the individuals from the richer quintiles. Identifying the richer beneficiaries should be relatively straightforward for local communities.

##### **Selection of the works**

4. Local authorities could be authorized to implement residual working days from the first phase during the second phase. For example, works may start earlier, may continue during week-ends or be completed beyond the official end of the second phase, if this does not create a competing demand for labour in agriculture at harvest time.

##### **Financing**

5. Given the scale of the programme, the system of daily payment of wages may be reconsidered as it is costly and unmanageable. Bi-weekly or weekly payment such as in the Indian Employment Guarantee Scheme may be considered after checking whether this meets the needs of the ultra poor who often, are only able to buy food after receiving their daily wage.

6. Additional human and financial resources may be allocated for the administration of the program in order to match the work load increase.

### **Monitoring**

7. There is scope for improvement in the contents of the monitoring information collected by the Government as well in the effectiveness of the monitoring processes. In the short run, the frequency of the Daily Achievement Report may be decreased to a weekly basis for example.
8. Greater collaboration at the Ministry level would minimise duplication of work and ensure greater transparency.

In the longer run, the outreach and outcome of the programme can be enhanced acting on the following priorities:

1. Rethink the aim of the programme and ensure consistency between its different objectives
2. Review the programme's intended beneficiaries and their characteristics
3. Ensure better preparation of those implementing the programme and greater understanding of the programme by the local communities
4. Adapt the choice of works to be carried out to the local needs and context.
5. Ensure that local level administrations have adequate personnel and funds to implement the program.
6. Assess and enhance the monitoring system.
7. Ensure systematic recording and redressal of grievances recording.

Recommendations on actions needed to address each one of the above priorities are given in the main report. These are followed by a description of possible follow up activities to this report that can be pursued in order to gauge the full impact of the programme.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BDI	BRAC Development Institute
BIDS	Bangladesh Institute of Development Institute
CBN	Cost of Basic Needs
CFPR/TUP	Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction/ Targeting the Ultra Poor
CFW	Cash-for-Work
CPD	Centre for Policy Dialogue
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DRRO	District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer
EC	European Commission
EGP	Employment Generation Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FY	Financial Year
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
HIES	Household Income and Expenditure Survey
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
LFS	Labour Force Surveys
MoFDM	Ministry of Food and Disaster Management
NFP	National Food Policy
NFPCSP	National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NSAPR II	National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II
PIC	Project Implementation Committee
PIO	Project Implementation Officer
RDRS	Rangpur Dinajpur Rehabilitation Service
RED	Research and Evaluation Division
REGS	Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
REOPA	Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets
SSN	Social Safety Nets
UNO	Upazila Nirbahi Officer
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VGD	Vulnerable Group Development
VGf	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WFP	World Food Programme

## **1. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY**

In September 2008, the Government of Bangladesh embarked on the first phase of a 100-day Employment Generation Programme (EGP) for the poorest and jobless poor. This endeavour came in response to the soaring food price situation which was acutely affecting the most vulnerable groups of the country.

The programme was to be implemented in two phases during the lean period – between mid September to end of November, and from beginning of March to end of April. While the entire country was to be covered, priority was to be given to river erosion and flood-affected, *monga* prone, *haor baors* and *char* areas. A total of twenty billion taka (equivalent to almost USD 300) were allocated in the fiscal budget for 2008/09 for this programme. Accordingly, a total of two million people were to avail this opportunity to work.

NFPCSP<sup>1</sup> was requested by the Government to assist in the appraisal of the programme through an evaluation of its first phase and the preparation for the assessment of the impact of the entire programme.

## **2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND MODALITIES**

The purpose of this study is to provide feedback to the Government on the implementation and preliminary results of the programme by the end of the first phase, to allow for fine-tuning of the modalities and implementation of the second phase of the programme. Thus, the focus is on the design and implementation, with a preliminary investigation of the early impacts of the programme on beneficiaries. In preparation for the evaluation of the overall impact of the 100-Day EGP, a baseline survey has also been undertaken in view of an impact study to be carried out at the end of the entire programme.

More specifically, the objectives of this study are:

- a) to review the design and implementation of the programme;
- b) to acquire a sense of the beneficiaries' and other stakeholders' perception of the impacts of the programme;
- c) to provide recommendations for fine tuning the program design and enhancing implementation during the second phase
- d) to prepare for the impact study following the closure of the programme with among other things, the establishment of a baseline.

Given the large scale of the 100-Day EGP, substantial resources to gather field-level data and information of adequate quality and quantity were required. In order to overcome these constraints, NFPCSP collaborated with the Research and Evaluation Division (RED) of the BRAC and the BRAC Development Institute (BDI) of BRAC University. These institutions have a clear competitive advantage in terms of field level knowledge and capacity to carry out large-scale field studies for which it has a substantial in-house and well-established pool of resources that can be quickly mobilised. In addition to this, BRAC-RED was already conducting research on its programme for the extreme poor as part of evaluation of BRAC's

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<sup>1</sup> The National food Policy Capacity Strengthening Program, implemented by FAO and the FPMU of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management with financing from EC and USAID, aims at enhancing the national capacity to formulate and implement food security policies. For more information refer to the web site [www.nfpcsp.org](http://www.nfpcsp.org).

CFPR/TUP<sup>2</sup> programme, and had plans to also cover aspects of the 100-Day EGP in their upcoming work<sup>3</sup>.

This partnership has allowed this study to be more substantial in scale than it would have been otherwise, and to carry out a baseline survey, an indispensable element for a systematic impact evaluation of the entire programme.

While NFPCSP concentrated on carrying out the activities that involved central levels of the Government, BRAC focused on parts requiring extensive fieldwork.

To ensure the highest possible standards and in order to provide technical guidance to this study, a Technical Advisory Committee involving leading reputed Bangladeshi social scientists from relevant fields was formed. The Committee advised on the design of the study and on the finalisation of the report before submission to the programme's Steering Committee.

The effectiveness of the study depended to a large extent on the prompt access to information by the researchers and the cooperation of Government officials at all levels. The responsible officers of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM) kindly ensured this.

This report is structured as follows: the methodology used for the study is reviewed. The next section contextualises the programme. This is followed by a section reviewing the design and implementation of the programme. A brief comparison with the Indian experience of Employment Guarantee schemes is then made, before turning to beneficiary and other stakeholders' perception of the initial impacts of the programme. The last section offers conclusions and recommendations.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The different objectives of the study warranted different approaches as detailed below.

#### *Review of the Guidelines, interviews with Ministry officials*

The review of the design, which involved desk work mostly, entailed an assessment of the objectives and design of the programme, mainly based on the analysis of the Implementation Guidelines produced by the Government, information on other Government safety nets, and the WFP/GoB poverty map were used for the design. Interviews with a selected number of government officials at Ministry and district levels were also needed to understand implementation processes<sup>4</sup>. The choice of districts to be reviewed was such that it corresponded to those where process documentation by the BRAC team at lower levels was

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<sup>2</sup> Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction/ Targeting the Ultra Poor

<sup>3</sup> BRAC's CFPR/TUP is a programme that targets the ultra poor in a large part of the country. 900,000 households are targeted in the second phase of their programme (in addition to 600,000 that were in the first phase which ended in 2006). BRAC's RED has carried out extensive research on this programme and continue to do so, in view of improving it and understanding its impacts. To find out more on BRAC-RED's research work on CFPR, visit <http://www.brac.net/research/index.html>.

This research has taken the form of a detailed study of the targeting process, as well as of extensive surveys of the areas covered by the programme which include CFPR participants as well as the general population. These surveys are repeated over time in order to appraise the evolution and include information on other development programmes that may affect the lives of the poor. Next, the surveys will also consider the 100-Day EGP as this is essential for BRAC to fully gauge the effects its own programme and contribute to the broader policy discussions on tackling extreme poverty. Moreover, given that BRAC's *palli samaj* have been involved at the local level in suggesting households to be selected for the programme, BRAC RED was at the time of the design of this study already planning a quick study to review the involvement of the *palli samaj* in the household selection and its effectiveness. The role of these institutions is referred to in a later section of this report.

<sup>4</sup> See Annex 1 for the checklist used in these interviews.

being carried out. This provided a complete picture of the entire information flow from central levels down to wards. In each of the selected districts, the Deputy Commissioners organised a meeting<sup>5</sup> with a number of relevant officials, for example Upazila Nirbahi Officers (UNOs) and Project Implementation Officers (PIOs), which allowed fruitful discussions based on different experiences. After these meetings, detailed interviews were conducted individually with the District Relief and Rehabilitation Officers (DRROs) and UNOs/PIOs of two or more upazilas.

#### *Survey*

Another other source of information for the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the programme and the assessment of preliminary impacts was the nationally representative survey carried out for this study. The survey took place in October-November 2008 in 45 randomly selected upazilas with a sample of 3,330 households. The sample size was calculated based on the mean and standard deviation of the outcome of interest. Inter-cluster correlation and design effects were also taken into consideration in calculating the sample size<sup>6</sup>.

Data were collected using pre-tested survey questionnaires by a total of 36 enumerators, following a two-week long training with a two day field training. Data entry and preliminary cleaning was done by data entry specialists at RED BRAC with further refinements made by the investigators. Informed consent was obtained from each respondent prior to interviews.

The survey is also to serve as a baseline for carrying out an impact study upon completion of the second phase of the programme. The questionnaire thus included questions regarding income, employment, expenditure, assets, food insecurity, and crisis coping and borrowing<sup>7</sup>.

#### *In depth qualitative study*

In-depth qualitative research was undertaken and involved contact with approximately 236 focus group participants and 75 individual interviewees. Additional intensive research into the local communities took place<sup>8</sup>. This qualitative analysis was executed in five locations in selected unions in the districts of Kurigram, Mymensingh, Jamalpur, Sirajgonj and Kishorgonj, chosen to represent river erosion and *monga* affected areas, *char* and *haor* regions and more general locations. One researcher resided in each selected Union for a duration of one month. The progress and direction of the five on-location researchers was overseen by three senior researchers who travelled between the five locations to ensure consistency and homogeneity in the research methods used.

## **4. BACKGROUND**

### **4.1 The 100-day EGP in the current national food security context**

In Bangladesh, social safety net programs are paramount in reducing short term deprivation and vulnerability among the poor. Indeed, a high concentration of people around the poverty line characterises the income distribution in Bangladesh, which implies that many are vulnerable to falling into poverty and/or become food insecure following small shocks.

The latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey- HIES (2005) reveals that around 40% of the population live in absolute poverty (using the upper poverty line as per the Cost of

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<sup>5</sup> See Annex 2 for the list of people interviewed and present at the district-level meetings.

<sup>6</sup> See Annex 3 for details of the sampling.

<sup>7</sup> See Annex 4 for the questionnaire.

<sup>8</sup> Annex 5 lists the interviews carried out in this regard.

Basic Needs method) and about 25% in extreme poverty (using the lower poverty line). Despite differences in methodologies, various recent assessments suggest that the successive shocks recently experienced by Bangladesh (devastating monsoon floods in July/September 2007, cyclone Sidr in November 2007 and soaring prices of food) might have pushed millions more into food insecurity and poverty (Rahman *et al* (2008); World Bank (2008), FAO/WFP (2008)). The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment (2008) and a study by Sulaiman *et al* (2009) on the 'Impact of Food Price on Nutritional Status of Women and Children' point to a number of adverse coping strategies, such as the reduction in the number of meals eaten per day, reduction in adult food consumption, borrowing of money or food, withdrawal of children from schools, and distress sales of productive assets, migration for work. Wasting among Under-5 children increased by 5.5 percentage points in the rural and by 6.7 percentage points in the urban areas, with the implication that at least 650,000 additional Under-5 children have become wasted largely as a result of the high food price (Sulaiman *et al.*, 2008).

In a context where access to food by many low income, poor and extreme poor people was challenged, the strategy of the Government has been to scale-up existing food-based safety net programs both in terms of coverage and benefits, and to introduce additional targeted schemes to meet the needs of those vulnerable segments of the population which are not currently covered by any safety net. This has meant an additional spending of USD250 million in FY07-08 and the budgetary allocation of around USD1 billion on food related programs for FY08-09. Among the new schemes, the 100-day EGP represents the most significant initiative. The programme has been designed to address the hardship faced by the rural extreme poor with an intended focus on those living in vulnerable geographical areas<sup>9</sup>.

As other rural workfare schemes, the 100-day EGP is to provide income transfers, enabling consumption smoothing during lean agricultural periods. Another built-in objective of the 100-day EGP also typical of rural workfare schemes is to link employment generation to the development and maintenance of small scale rural infrastructure, aimed at enhancing agricultural productivity and sustainability. Some of the productive assets generated by the programme can be expected to generate second-round employment benefits as needed infrastructure is developed.

The 100-day EGP's intended focus and design finds a strong rationale in the unemployment, food insecurity and poverty context of Bangladesh which can be characterized as follows:

❖ **Rural bias**

Absolute and extreme poverty rates exceed the national average in rural areas. Over 56 million people live on less than 2,122 kcal/day/per capita with 41.2 million in rural areas. Of these, 27 million live on less than 1805 kcal/day/capita (hard core or extreme poor), 18.7 million of them in rural areas<sup>10</sup>. As noted earlier, the natural disasters and the food price crisis experienced in the recent period are likely to have significantly raised the number of poor, extreme poor and food insecure.

Within rural areas, agricultural labour households have a higher incidence of poverty: extreme poverty incidence is more than double the national average in households headed by a person working as agricultural wage labour (HIES, 2005).

❖ **Significance of labour income for the rural poor**

Labour income is key to the livelihoods of the poor, accounting for more than 85% of total income in the lowest income quintile. The lack of labour income entails a high risk

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<sup>9</sup> Section 5.2.1. offers a detailed review of the objectives of the programme.

<sup>10</sup> These numbers are calculated by BBS based on the HIES 2005, using the Direct Calorie Intake method.

of poverty and food insecurity. The latest Labour Survey (BBS, 2007) shows that unemployment -accounting for unpaid family helpers working less than 15 hours a week- stands at 14.2% in rural Bangladesh, reaching 46.4% among women, while among the rural unemployed, about 26% remain unemployed for at least seven months.

#### ❖ **Seasonality**

A major source of vulnerability, food insecurity and malnutrition is seasonality. As noted by the Bangladesh Bank (2008), ‘an important limitation of informal employment especially in the rural areas is the high incidence of seasonality [...]. During the off season (which is linked with the agricultural production cycle), employment in the rural areas usually shrinks. This means that employment and income of some workers remain unprotected throughout the year due to seasonal unemployment and/or underemployment’ (p.9).

An estimated 5.3 million extreme poor live in *monga*-affected district of Rangpur, Gaibandha, Kurigram, Lalmonirhat and Nilphamari, where agriculture represents the mainstay of the economy. *Monga* is the local term used to denote the period of seasonal hunger which generally occurs every year between mid-September and mid-November – the slack period between planting and harvesting- in the northern part of Bangladesh (World Bank, 2008). Households who primarily rely upon agricultural wages see their pre-harvest purchasing power drop dramatically due a rise in the prices of food staples and the fall in labour demand and wages. Limited diversification in the rural economy also means few alternative employment opportunities. In years of drought or flood, destruction of the *aman* crop further prolongs the period of seasonal unemployment and food shortage.

Seasonal deprivation is also common in other parts of the country such as the *char* areas. Bangladesh counts several hundred islands known as *chars* of which less than 40% are partially cultivable; every year the *chars* experience flooding, leading to loss of cultivable land and other assets and forces the relocation of families; livelihood options, including wage earning are very limited. A large majority of people living in *char* islands are thus among the country’s extreme poor. Because of landlessness, most of households are dependent upon daily labour for large parts of the year. The lack of local employment opportunities, including opportunities for seasonal agricultural employment lead to seasonal migration. Limited connectivity also worsens poverty.

In such context, programs such as the 100-day EGP can play a critical role in the seasonal stabilization of incomes to prevent acute distress, nutritional deficiency and the adoption of adverse coping strategies, in line with rights-based development approaches.

#### **4.2. Positioning of the programme within the government safety net system and other non-governmental programmes**

The Government currently runs five types of Social Safety Net programmes (SSN): cash support programmes, food aid programmes, special programmes for poverty reduction, self-employment through micro credit, and some specific programmes for poverty alleviation. At present, the social safety net activities are based on five criteria: income, occupation, physical ability, ethnicity, gender and regional disparity. However, not all individuals falling under a specific criterion are covered. For example, in spite of the income criteria, only part of the country’s poor and hard core poor are covered. Also, in spite of the regional disparity dimension, a number of backward areas such as certain *chars* hardly benefit from any SSN (GoB, 2008b).

There are currently around 45 safety net programs operated by the Government (GoB, 2008b). A majority of these programs is targeted to the rural population. Recent evaluations of the SSN programs in Bangladesh point to other weaknesses which are of particular relevance with regard to the objectives of the 100-day EGP. These include:

❖ **Low coverage of the extreme poor**

The coverage of eligible individuals by SSNs is low with only 13% of households in Bangladesh benefiting from at least one safety net (World Bank, 2008). According to the HIES (2005) survey, only 22% of households in the bottom quintiles are covered by targeted programs. This points to the existence of targeting errors - both inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the World Bank (2008) estimates that 41% of targeted programme beneficiaries are non-poor (i.e. top three quintiles).

❖ **Small scale of the safety net**

The benefits provided by the social safety nets (SSNs) are small: for example, the food benefit from Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) is just 21% of the lower poverty line (World Bank, 2008).

❖ **Overlapping**

Some households participate in more than one program. This may be appropriate in some cases but not others as noted in section 5.2.1.

❖ **Mismatch between safety net and poverty geographical distribution**

Geographical coverage of safety nets does not tightly correlate with division-wise poverty rates. For instance, Khulna has the second highest poverty rate (45.7%) after Rajshahi, but the lowest SSN coverage (11%), especially among the lowest income decile (World Bank, 2008).

❖ **Limited number of social safety schemes linked to income-generation and broader development goals and lack of a 'graduation' focus**

Most existing programs limit themselves to sustaining people's standard of living above a given threshold. They fail to adopt a longer term vision whereby the safety net could be designed to provide beneficiaries an opportunity to rise above the state of vulnerability they are in. Associating the safety net with skills development training for example (as is the case for the Vulnerable Group Development- VGD) may enable participants to undertake an income generating activity.

❖ **Limited number of programs geared toward *ex-ante* mitigation of shocks – 'social insurance'**

The majority of safety nets currently in operation aim to enhance the capacity of households to cope with risks, rather than provide *ex ante* insurance against the adverse impact of risks. Pensions and insurance are thus largely unavailable, especially in the informal sector (World Bank, 2008).

The EGP represents a major breakthrough towards expanding coverage of employment generation-focused safety nets. With an estimated two million households or about 10 million beneficiaries, the EGP is the largest GoB SSN programme focused on employment generation. It distinguishes itself from others not only by its scale, but also by its intended focus on the extreme poor and the unemployed poor (see Table 1). Complementarity with other programs is also sought through the exclusion of households benefiting from any other SSN (a condition for eligibility also retained in the recently launched Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets – REOPA).

Among other non-government operated employment generation focused programs, the DFID-funded *Chars* Livelihood Programme (CLP) aims to improve the livelihood security of the

poorest people living in the Northern riverine/*char* areas of Kurigram, Gaibandha, Jamalpur, Bogra and Sirajganj districts with the longer term objective of lifting six million people out of poverty. Similar to the 100-day EGP, the programme employment generation activities addresses transient food insecurity associated with *monga* along with disaster risk reduction through investments in households assets. In Kurigram, Gaibandha and Jamalpur districts, during the *monga* period of 2006, the CLP created over one million person-days of employment in labour intensive earthwork, with over 25,000 men and 12,000 women engaged in cash-for-work (CFW) projects<sup>11</sup>. A major objective of the CLP is to guarantee employment during *monga* to the food insecure in the *chars* with a target of over two million person days per year of employment, double the current levels. As of end of May 2008, the programme had provided 2.6 million person days of employment<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Work provided for a minimum of 25 and a maximum of 30 days at a wage rate fixed at Tk 80 per day.

<sup>12</sup> See <http://www.clp-Bangladesh.org/>

**Table 1. Employment-generation focused food-mediated and cash-based programs (other than micro-credit based)**

	<b>Objectives</b>	<b>Targeting/ Eligibility criteria</b>	<b>Implementation</b>	<b>Coverage FY08-09</b>	<b>Budget allocation FY08-09 Tk million</b>
100-day EGP	Employment for extreme rural poor unemployed people/increasing purchasing power of extreme poor affected by price hike	Extreme poor and permanent capable resident and marginal farmers in rural areas (esp. vulnerable areas)/ Eager to work but unemployed and unskilled poor people/ Landless Not permanent or temporary farm labourer/ Not benefiting from other on-going SSN	MoFDM	200 million person days	20,000
FFW	Employment generation for the poor in slack season/ Dvlpt. and maintenance of rural infrastructure	Landless, women headed hhs, day labour and temporary workers, people with income less than 300 Tk/month	GOB/ADB/WFP and MoLGD, MSW and MWR	4.7 million person months	15,776
Test Relief	Employment generation for poverty stricken people in rainy season/ dvlpt maintenance of rural infrastructure	Poverty stricken areas	GOP/DPs/MoFDM	1.9 million person months	6,315
Food Support for Chittagong Hill Tracts	Employment generation/ Infrastructure dvlpt.	-	GOB/MCHT	0.74 million person months	2,379
Rural Employment Opportunities for Public Assets (REOPA)	Empowerment of women/Rural infrastructure maintenance	Hhs with less than 0.3 ha of land/ female headed hhs/ Hhs with no other income and not participating in other targeted programs	GOB/EC/ MoLGD	24,000 women	
Employment Generation for Hard Core Poor		-	PKSF	0.1 million individuals	1,000
Rural Employment and Road Maintenance Program		-	MoLGD	5 million individuals	1,900

Source: WB (2008) and GoB (2008b)

### 4.3. Positioning of the 100-Day EGP viz policy frameworks for poverty reduction and food security

The 100-Day EGP is in line with the main policy frameworks dealing with poverty and food security. Thus, the National Food Policy - NFP (2006) underscores greater geographical targeting of food-mediated and other safety nets to specific distress-dense areas of the country, especially those with 'less employment opportunities, lower level of infrastructure and agricultural development and in particular the frequent incidence of natural calamities. With respect to all these concerns, flood prone areas, particularly those affected by land erosion along the major river banks (...) are considered as the most nutritionally distressed areas of the country. The Government therefore targets the population groups, regions and seasons where nutritional stress is most acute through income transfers, targeted food distribution and public works programs' (p.10). Finally, one may note that the 100-day EGP programme departs from the NFP, in the sense that it is 'gender neutral' and does not specifically give priority to poor women, a major target group of the NFP with regard to income generating activities.

Likewise, the NFP Plan of Action, approved by the Food Planning and Monitoring Committee on 5 August 2008, explicitly calls for expanding coverage and strengthening the effectiveness of employment generation focused safety net programs – with particular reference to Food-for-Work and Cash-for-Work in *monga*-prone areas and other disadvantaged regions.

The National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (NSAPR II) also recommends support to *monga*-prone areas through agricultural diversification and food assisted infrastructure development during lean seasons.

The range of works envisaged by the Implementation Guidelines is another example of alignment with the NFP with its strategic provisions on agricultural development, which underlines the importance of investment in rural infrastructure.

## 5. ASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

### 5.1. Preparation of the programme

#### Box 1. Timing in Madargonj upazila, Jamalpur

In Madargonj upazila, supervisory officers under one union reported being asked on August 22 to complete a list of beneficiaries by August 30. Suddenly the deadline for the preparation of the list was changed to August 26 giving them just two days to complete the assignment. In addition to this extremely tight time schedule, they had been informed earlier that the works to be carried out under the programme would be of a light nature. "How accurate can a list be, when it has been hurriedly put together in two days without any preparation?" Although this prevented the list from being entirely accurate, the supervisory officer tried to ensure that selected people were in adequate physical condition.

Because this programme was devised in response to an emergency situation arising from the hike in food prices, the Government was confronted to a trade-off between acting fast to relieve the suffering of the poor and taking adequate time to prepare the launch of this significant programme (Box 1). Thus, a recurrent complaint at all levels of implementation was the lack

of adequate preparation and guidance before the initiating of the programme. For example, no formal orientation was held on how to administrate this programme, giving little opportunity to ask for clarifications. In some instances even, the Guidelines were not received in time. In the

five upazilas where an in-depth study was carried out, none of the UP Chairmen or members had seen the Implementation Guidelines. Despite this however, instances where the proactive involvement of local government officials and locally elected representatives made a real difference were found.

Upon receipt of the Implementation Guidelines and additional circulars, the district level personnel briefed the upazila level structures who in turn advised the union parishad members.

The imprecision and at times, the lack of clarity of the Implementation Guidelines have left a lot of grey areas for field level implementers to sort out. This approach of learning-by-doing which this programme seems to have adopted is not problematic in itself but would seem more adapted to a pilot programme rather to an endeavour of this scale. This gave rise to a situation whereby those responsible in the Ministry had to dedicate a very substantial amount of their time responding to specific queries on different implementation aspects of the programme instead of focusing on monitoring its operations.

- **Orientation workshops for those implementing the programme at the field level were recommended (as is the case for other government programmes and in the NREGS).**
- **Given the recurrence of the themes on which clarifications were sought, records should be kept and a troubleshooting manual developed for future use, if possible to be posted on the internet for easy access to all.**

The lack of adequate time to put in place the programme has also meant limited public awareness raising and thus knowledge on the programme. In depths interview carried out revealed varied ways through which people have been informed about the programme: through the media and word-of-mouth, through the UP Chairman, UP members, or people sent by the UP Chairman going from door-to-door<sup>13</sup> of poor residents. In some instances, erroneous information was provided to convince people to participate (additional benefits were promised such as food and clothing) or to try and prevent dropping out (beneficiaries were told that this was punishable by law).

- **A communication campaign would be useful in preventing misunderstandings by the population.**

## **5.2. Beneficiary selection**

### **5.2.1. Selection criteria as per the Implementation Guidelines**

This section reviews the criteria set to identify beneficiaries as per the Implementation Guidelines. One issue that arises from this exercise is the lack of consistency between the different criteria as well as between the criteria defined and the objectives set for the programme.

As per Section 2 of the Guidelines, the main objective of this programme is ‘to bring rural extreme poor and capable people including marginal farmers under social safety net during the time they remain unemployed’. In Section 9.0 of the Guidelines, the terms and qualifications to

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<sup>13</sup> This took place in a few cases after the Chairman realized, after having prepared a list of beneficiaries, that more names were needed and therefore sought applicants.

become beneficiary are further refined, raising doubts as to the exact required characteristics to become a beneficiary. The categories defined are thus:

- a) The extreme poor including marginal farmers who are capable and permanent residents of rural areas including river erosion, *monga* prone, *haor baor* and *char* areas.
- b) Those eager to work but unemployed and unskilled poor person. Unskilled poor persons mean day labourers or farm labourers who are not trained as masons, carpenters, electricians, gas mechanics or mill workers, or persons who have no alternative employment opportunities. Those permanently, temporarily or semi-permanently labour of a farm or solvent family are not allowed to register under this programme.
- c) The landless (with 0.5 or less acres of cultivable land) who have a low income and have no pond for fish culture and no animal resources.

In the following, we examine these targeting criteria and question their suitability given the objectives of the programme.

***a) The extreme poor including marginal farmers, who are capable and permanent residents of rural areas including river erosion, monga prone, haor baor and char areas***

The validity of the very first part of this targeting criterion - *the extreme poor*- may be questioned for its generic nature. Different stakeholders interpret this term differently. For example, the World Bank defines extreme poverty as living on less than US\$1.25 per day<sup>14</sup>, while DFID considers the extreme poor as those living on less than US\$0.25 a day, yielding a figure of 7% for Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) uses two methods to calculate poverty. The first is the Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) using an upper and a lower poverty line. The latter is the measure on which the Government has relied to calculate the beneficiary card allocation for the 100-Day EGP. It yields a poverty rate of 25% in 2005<sup>15</sup>. The CBN poverty lines represent the level of per capita expenditure at which a household can be expected to meet their basic needs (food and non-food). The method adopted by BBS is the Direct Calorie intake. Three categories of poor are defined according to this method: the absolute poor who consume less than 2,122 kcal per day, the hardcore poor who consume less than 1,805 kcal per day and the ultra poor who consume less than 1,600 kcal per day. These yield poverty rate of respectively 40.2%, 18.1% and 6.9%.

Given that for the purposes of this programme, the Government defines the extreme poor as those under the lower poverty line using the CBN method, the question remains as to how those living below the poverty line are identified given that a systematic identification would entail a study of potential beneficiaries' expenditure level. One possibility could be that the other characteristics included in this first category of people act as proxy characteristics to be able to identify the extreme poor. This is indeed what other programs that target the extreme poor do<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Adjusted for PPP.

<sup>15</sup> This is measured by: (i) estimating a food poverty line as the cost of a fixed food bundle (in case of Bangladesh, consisting of 11 key items), providing minimal nutritional requirements corresponding to 2122 kcal/day/person; and (ii) adding an 'allowance' for non-food consumption to the food poverty line. For the lower poverty line, the non-food allowance is the average non food expenditure of households whose total consumption is equal to the food poverty line; whereas for the upper poverty line, the non-food allowance is the average non food expenditure of households whose food consumption was equal to the food poverty line. As prices and consumption patterns vary between different geographical areas, poverty lines are estimated for each of 16 different geographical areas.

<sup>16</sup> The DFID Chars Livelihoods Programme (CLP) for example whose purpose CLP is to improve the livelihoods security of extremely poor people concentrates on areas of high extreme poor density (the *chars*) and uses a number of criteria such as landlessness and lack of assets.

The idea of being *capable* raised some questions at the field level with in some cases, women not being selected as beneficiaries in spite of their obvious need for this programme, because not deemed capable of doing such physically-demanding work.

Finally, the geographical focus on the river erosion, *monga* prone, *haor baor* and *char* areas is understandable in that these are where some of the most vulnerable people live in Bangladesh. This is in fact consistent with the provisions of the NFP (2006) and the National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008-2015) as discussed in a previous section.

While in other parts of the Guidelines the focus of the 100-Day EGP is distinctively intended to be on these areas (see Sections 5 and 6 of the Guidelines), here, it is just given as an example of rural areas (*including* river erosion, *monga* prone, *haor baor* and *char* areas'). It is thus difficult to understand whether the programme is intended to give priority to these areas or not, by proportionately allocating more cards to them. We further discuss this geographical targeting and its actual application (or rather lack thereof) in 5.2.3.

***b) Those eager to work but unemployed and unskilled poor persons. Unskilled poor persons means day labourers or farm labourers who are not trained as masons, carpenters, electricians, gas mechanics or mill workers, or persons who have no alternative employment opportunities. Those permanently, temporarily or semi-permanently labour of a farm or solvent family are not allowed to register under this programme.***

Again, in this category, some leeway is left for interpretation. The term *poor* is very wide in scope and does not necessarily mean the extreme poor. Does this then mean that the programme may involve, in principle, people who are not extreme poor, provided they are *unskilled, unemployed and eager to work*? Eagerness to work here refers to the self selection mechanism as not everyone will be eager to work at the offered rate of Tk 100 per day.

The rationale behind the choice of only letting those that are unemployed apply may be questioned. Indeed, in Bangladesh, 'the unemployment rate does not provide a meaningful measure of labour market slack because in the absence of a comprehensive social security system only the better off can afford not to work, while the rest needs to survive by working in low intensity, low paid daily wage jobs or self-employment'. Thus, 'underemployment is more common than unemployment' (World Bank, 2008). In a recent review of labour market conditions in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Bank (2008) stresses that '[a]lthough the 'standard' unemployment rate is low at 4.2 percent in 2006, it does not provide a real picture of the supply-demand balance including the degree of inefficiency that prevails in the labour market' (p.1). Thus, about 20.5% of the population employed in the agricultural sector is found to work less than 15 hours/week, and 36.5% less than 30 hours/week (BBS, 2008). The last part describing this category of eligible people raises doubt as to whether indeed only the unemployed are eligible in that by only eliminating those '*permanently, temporarily or semi-permanently labour of a farm or solvent family*', it could imply those who are temporarily employed but not from farm or solvent families to apply.

***c) The landless (with 0.5 or less acres of cultivable land) who have a low income and have no pond for fish culture and no animal resources***

While landlessness may not always be synonymous with extreme poverty in that some households may have shifted their income sources to the non farm sector (Nargis and

Hossain, 2006), this category ensures that these landless have low income and no other productive agricultural resources to speak of. However, again, the way this is specified may not ensure it is the extreme poor that are included in this category.

In addition to the categories reviewed above, the Guidelines include eligibility criteria:

❖ **The person should be capable and aged between 18 and 50.**

While the rationale behind the age category has probably to do with the ability to perform the work, 50 years old seems low as an upper limit. In fact, if the Government's intention is to try and cover the extreme poor through its safety nets, it should take into consideration that the Old Age Pension safety net is only given to those above 65 years. This potentially leaves some of those between 50 and 65 without any cover. The concept of *capability* to perform the work is reiterated here and in fact brings us to question the selection mechanism.

❖ **Individuals considered for the programme should not be covered by any other safety net.**

In the three occasions in which this condition is mentioned in the Guidelines (Sections 4, 9 and 10), it is stated that the beneficiary should not be receiving any other help from the Government. While the rationale behind this rule is readily understandable, it may not be appropriate in all cases and poses the risk of leaving some families in a very vulnerable position. For example, a woman receiving the allowance for the Widowed, Deserted, and Destitute Women which amounts to Tk.180, if unemployed and living in a household with no other income earner, will be in dire need of another income source such as the one offered by the 100 day EGP. Yet, with the rule put in place, she is excluded.

Moreover, the Guidelines may be considered ambiguous when they state that 'for determining beneficiaries, any duplication of this programme with any other social safety net programmes is to be avoided through proper coordination'. Indeed, one reading of this sentence may be that those who are currently benefiting from another safety net or *whose household as a whole* benefits from another safety net should be excluded<sup>17</sup>. Again, while this intended to exclude households that for example, already benefit from the Vulnerable Group Development safety net and this receive 30 kg of wheat per month, it may exclude a household where a child is receiving the Primary Education Stipend which targets the same type of household, but provides only Tk.100 per single student family. It is clear from the examples given that the side effects of this exclusion factor need to be considered and the eligibility criteria reformulated to specify which types of safety net beneficiaries should be excluded.

While this exclusion rule is seen as a way to ensure complementarity between the 100-Day EGP and other safety nets, it is in fact about avoiding duplication. However, as just seen, duplication of safety nets may not always be problematic. In fact, looking the Government may want to look for complementarities between some of its programmes, and even with those of non government actors.

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<sup>17</sup> And indeed, it was found that in their majority, Ministry level authorities did interpret this exclusion rule in this way.

A brief review of the beneficiary selection criteria has uncovered of inconsistencies which reveal a degree of confusion in the objectives of the programme which reveals to a certain extent, the over ambition in wanting to address too many problems with a single program.

- **The beneficiary selection criteria may be reassessed to make them consistent with the objectives of the programme and compatible with each other.**
- **The age selection criterion may be adjusted to allow for still able-bodied individuals excluded from other safety nets to join the programme.**
- **An effort should be made to choose criteria which are easily identifiable by the local bodies in charge of selecting the beneficiaries and ensuring proper targeting and monitoring.**
- **The Government may consider explicitly listing other programmes (Government and possibly non Government), participation in which will constitute an exclusion factor for the 100-Day EGP. It may also consider exploring complementarities between the 100-Day EGP and its other safety nets.**


### **5.2.2. Beneficiary identification process**

The identification of the two million beneficiaries, as per the Guidelines, was to be finalised by the 31<sup>st</sup> of August. As described in a later section, the MoFDM, in close collaboration with WFP, BBS and other Ministries identified the methodology to decide on the number of cards to be distributed per upazila (see Section 5.2.3.). This information was then to be communicated to the Deputy Commissioners who transmitted the information to the UNOS. The latter then had to decide on the number of beneficiaries per ward based on poverty/employment concentration. In cases where the UNO failed to do this, the Union Parishad carried out this task. The Union Parishad members then decided on a list of names of potential beneficiaries based on their knowledge of the ward population and in consultation with the community. This was put to the Union Disaster Management Committee which conducted interviews with people from the list and based on this, recommended selected names for approval of registration. The Union level Supervising Officer then reviewed the list of beneficiaries and ensured the publication of the list. The final list was communicated to the Upazila Disaster Management Committee which approved the list. Once finalised, the selected beneficiaries had to register with the Union Parishad offices. At the district level, the Deputy Commissioner carried out a final check to ensure no beneficiary availed of any other safety net (Figure 1).

It is clear from this description of the process that was to take place, that the intention of the Government was to leave the responsibility of selecting the beneficiaries to the community -albeit to the influential members of the community. A number of in-built mechanisms were put in place to try and ensure that the right people were targeted. The Bangladesh programme differs from the Indian one in that the latter is based on self selection and individual applications with the assumption that only the poorest will be willing to work at such low wage rate (see Annex 7).

An important observation is that the description of this process in the Guidelines does not follow a step-by-step approach. This makes its understanding rather difficult and leaves wide scope for misunderstanding and interpretation. In the absence of any training or additional instructions, the Guidelines constituted the only tool for field officers to understand the process which may have less to some differences from place to place.


**Figure 1. Selection of beneficiaries – 100- day EGP**



- An effort should be made to render the Guidelines more clear with respect to the selection of beneficiaries. A first step towards clarity is to follow a step-by-step approach in the description of the process.
- Following the Indian approach, the Government may want to reconsider the selection process, introducing a self selection mechanism whereby individuals would apply to join the programme and the Government administration would exclude those that are not eligible.

### 5.2.3. Geographical distribution and consistency with the programme's priorities

Figure 2. GOB/ WFP poverty map



In its attempt to focus the programme on the poorest of the country, in order to calculate the number of cards to be allocated by upazila, the Government used the poverty map established by a 2004 study by the Government of Bangladesh in collaboration with the World Food Programme.


The GoB/WFP study estimated poverty and malnutrition at the upazila level, using a variant of the small area estimation technique as pioneered by the World Bank. The map used was one based on the Cost of Basis Needs Approach (CBN) with the lower poverty line (Figure 2). It should be noted that the maps obtained using both the lower and upper poverty line, for the three measures of the Foster - Greer - Thorbecke indicators were highly correlated. This means that one can expect the outcomes of the card calculation would have been similar using another poverty measure at least in terms of ranking of one upazila over another.

Using this study to determine the number of poor individuals per upazila, the number of cards to be distributed was calculated *proportionally to the number of poor in each upazila*, as defined

using the lower poverty line. This in fact, amounted to distribute beneficiary cards to 5% of the extreme poor in each district/upazila<sup>18</sup>.

Although equitable from a national perspective, this is not consistent with the priority set by the Guidelines of putting emphasis on the most vulnerable areas of the country. As mentioned earlier, as per some section of the programme Guidelines and conversations with the Government authorities, although all 64 districts of the country are to be covered by the programme, priority is intended to have been given to river erosion, flood affected, *monga* prone, *haor baor* and *char* areas. For the actual distribution of cards to reflect this Government objective, the percentage of cards distributed to the extreme poor should have been higher in these areas.

**Figure 3. Cards distributed as percentage of the total**



**cards allocated countrywide, by district**

The implication of the method used is that the number of cards distributed depends not only on the extreme poverty rate of the area but also on the total population of the area. Thus, an upazila with a relatively low poverty rate as per the GoB/WFP study may have been allocated many cards simply because of its substantial population. In Figure 3, the cards distributed by district as a percentage of the two million cards are mapped, in order to get a sense of which areas the programme actually concentrated on.

From this, it is clear that some of the areas which the Government intended to focus more on (Figure 4) are in fact receiving fewer cards than other areas in proportion of the total cards allocated nationally. Lalmonirhat for example, one of the main

*monga* affected areas with 36% extreme poor only receives 1.1% of the cards distributed in the country against Comilla for example, which receives 2.9% of all the cards distributed although it is not one of the priority areas (and whose extreme poor constitute 19.8% of the population) Other districts which are receiving fewer cards in proportion in spite of being ‘priority areas’ are: Nilphamari, Patuakhali, Bhola, Sunamganj, Habiganj and Sherpur.


<sup>18</sup> With a total number of cards to be distributed of two million and a total number of extreme poor in the country of 40 million, for each district and upazila, the number of cards allocated was calculated as follows: (Percentage of ultra poor in the district/upazila\* population in the district/upazila)/(2 million)/(40 million) . This is equivalent to: (number of extreme poor in the district/upazila)\* 5%.

By distributing the cards proportionally to the number of the poor in each upazila, the Government implicitly renounced on focusing the resources on areas with higher poverty concentration, in favour of giving an equal opportunity to all extreme poor independently from their geographical location.

**Figure 4. Geographical focus of programme as per the Guidelines**

Another aim of the programme is to tackle seasonal unemployment. One interesting exercise is to compare the areas with higher prevalence of unemployment – to the extent that structural unemployment may be indicative of seasonal unemployment – to the incidence of 100 day EGP card holders. It is clear from this that the districts suffering most from unemployment are not those where most cards have been distributed ( Figure 5).

The review of the actual distribution of the cards points to a degree of mismatch between the intended objectives and what has actually been done. To the extent that the cards have been distributed in proportion to the absolute number of extreme poor in each upazila, particularly vulnerable areas have not been given priority, nor have areas with higher unemployment rates.




**Figure 5. Unemployment rate per district (in %)**

➤ Consistency between the objectives of the Programme and the method through which the number of beneficiary cards per district is allocated needs to be ensured. This may entail reviewing and or reducing the number of eligibility criteria and adjusting the targeting method accordingly.

➤ If specific focus is intended for certain areas of the country, the percentage of extreme poor to be covered in those areas should be increased relative to percentage of extreme poor covered in other areas.

➤ The decision to give priority to the extreme poor in specific areas should perhaps be carefully assessed based on considerations such as: concentration, severity and persistence of poverty over time, as well as considerations regarding the existence of other safety nets and anti poverty interventions in the area.



### 5.3. Targeting effectiveness

#### 5.3.1. Experience with the selection of beneficiaries

Interviews with district, upazila and union level Government officials revealed that the official criteria for selection of beneficiaries had not always been clearly understood and in some cases were not even known. Yet, overall, we find that the selection criteria of poverty, age and exclusion from other safety net programmes was respected.

**Table 2. Beneficiary and non beneficiary (general population) characteristics**

Indicators		Overall		
		Beneficiary	Non-beneficiary	significance
Poverty and food security	Poverty likelihood (less than dollar a day based on poverty scorecard)	50	35	***
	Per capita annual income (mean in TK)	43,427	55,799	***
	Per capital daily food expenditure (mean)	28	30	***
	Per capita annual clothing expenditure (mean)	533	692	***
HH characteristics	Household Size (mean)	4.6	4.5	
	Working age (15-65 yrs) members (mean)	2.7	2.7	
	Female headed household (%)	10	7	***
	Head can read and write (%)	16	31	***
Source of livelihood	Any member in the HH receiving gov safety net support (other than 100day egp) (%)	12	13	
	At least one member in the HH engaged in day labor (%)	83	46	***
	Agr. wage (mean for HHs with members engaged in agri day labor)	116	113	
	Non-agri wage (mean for HHs with members engaged in non-agri day labor)	120	120	
Assets	HH have migrant labor (any member stayed outside village for work) (%)	13	11	
	Own homestead land (%)	74	83	***
	Own cultivable land (%)	14	34	***
	Owens at least 50 decimal land (%)	4	22	***
	Owens cattle (%)	37	47	***
	Main material of wall of house is tin-wood or brick (%)	36	46	***
	Number of living rooms in the house (mean)	1.5	1.7	***
	Household have electricity connection (%)	21	34	***
Savings of the HH (mean)	1,163	7,974	***	

Note: \*\*\* means at the difference is significant at a 1% level.

### ***Allocation of cards per ward***

The basis on which UNOs decided on the number of cards to allocate per ward varied widely. While the official criteria were poverty and unemployment intensity, the in-depth qualitative study found that at times, the decision was based uniquely on the number of people in one area, and not the poverty intensity, arguing that poverty was pervasive in all areas in question. The unemployment intensity criterion was broadly ignored.

### ***Consultation processes***

Although the involvement of a number of people and consultations with relevant individuals was foreseen in the Guidelines, in several cases, the UP Chairman or members did not consult anyone else in deciding who should be on the list. Although a union level supervising officer was supposed to review and check the list, he had little power to challenge the choices that had been made.

The Guidelines also speak of NGO involvement in the selection of beneficiaries and works. Some reservations were expressed at the Ministry level in that NGOs may try to favour their own clients. In practice, NGOs's help was sought in a number of cases. BRAC's involvement was significant through the *palli samaj*<sup>19</sup>. They listed a total of 209,876 names of which 59% were short listed and 25.3% finally selected. Other sporadic examples of NGO assistance were observed during the field studies. In Kurigram for example, the DRRO organised a mass meeting

<sup>19</sup> Through its Social Development programme, BRAC facilitates the organization of ward level federations (*palli samaj*) consisting of poor people, some of them members of micro finance institutions. These federations of the poor are used to uphold the rights of the poor and gain access to resources that are meant for the poor. There are 12,370 such groups throughout the country covering 31% of the wards of Bangladesh. *Palli samaj* are present in 61 districts but have not been set up in the three Chittagong Hill Tracts districts. Having been informed about the launch of the 100-Day EGP, each *palli samaj* was asked to draw a list of the poorest among their communities to communicate to the local government so as to help in ensuring that the poorest do get included in the selection process.

inviting all persons involved at the ward level, and including NGOs such as RDRS, Zibika and Solidarity in an attempt to sensitise everyone to the programme.

### ***Poverty***

Beneficiaries were significantly more likely to be poor than non beneficiaries. In fact, their average income was 3,619 taka per month against 4,650 for non beneficiaries. Their per capita daily food expenditure was also significantly lower as is their spending on clothing. On average, fewer assets were held by participants to the programme (from land, to cattle, to housing and savings). The difference is particularly stark for household savings where the average is of 1,163 taka for beneficiaries compared to 7,974 for non-beneficiaries (Table 2).

The perception of the programme by the UP members and Chairmen influenced the selection process. While some understood it to be ‘a programme for the poor’, others thought it to be ‘a project for earth digging’ (*mati katar kaj*). Thus in some areas, the focus was on the degree of destitution and vulnerability (e.g. widows), in others, on the seasonal unemployment of the poor. In some cases – those where the programme was seen as an earth digging one- while poverty remained the main focus, preference was given to those experienced with earth digging work, again demonstrating the communication gap that existed between the Ministry and the field level.

In the cases where the programme was understood to be destined to the extreme poor, UP members were hard pressed to give a definition of what constituted a poor person, let alone an extreme poor one.

- **Given that ‘only’ 5% of the extreme poor in each upazila were covered by the programme, stricter guidelines should be provided to field level officers as to whom among those eligible should be given priority.**

### ***Age - Individual vs. household participation***

On the whole, the age range officially set (18-50) was respected in the choice of beneficiaries: just 11% of those registered fell outside this range, most of them (9.5%) being above 50. In practice however, when an officially selected beneficiary could not attend work, replacements were made which the in-depth qualitative study revealed, included some adolescent (or even younger) children and older women (children and parents). In some cases, individuals who had been selected as beneficiaries had later migrated to better paid jobs, leaving their wives to take over their position. This finding raises the issue of ‘replacements’ which under the Implementation Guidelines are not given as an option.

There is also no scope in the current design to deal with absenteeism. Yet some labourers dropped out of the programme after a few days, leaving a vacancy which under the current Guidelines could not be reallocated to anyone else.

- **The 100-day EGP may consider introducing some flexibility in terms of intra household labour allocation. For instance, it may consider changing the beneficiary unit of the programme to the household rather than the individual, as it the case for the India NREGA (see Annex 7).**

### ***Participation in other safety nets***

On the provision excluding individuals benefiting from other safety nets, no difficulties were reported regarding the implementation of this condition as records are available in the PIO and DRRO offices. In spite of the widespread understanding that beneficiaries should not be from households where safety nets other than the 100-Day EGP one are being perceived, 12% of the participants come from such families (Table 2). This is not statistically different from the percentage reported for the general population which shows that on the whole the exclusion criterion has not been followed. Further analysis however reveals that among participants, in those belonging to the poorest income quartile, 9.7% benefit from another safety net, against 13.4%, 15.5% and 11.8% for the second, third and fourth quartiles<sup>20</sup>. These differences are statistically significant at a 10% level, suggesting that, surprisingly, this rule was applied more strictly for the poorest.

There may be a number of reasons for the presence of other safety net beneficiaries among 100-Day EGP participants. Beneficiaries may have willingly hidden their participation in other safety nets to increase their benefits. Indeed, the in-depth study unveiled instances where names on the 100-Day EGP registry were wrongly entered in order to enable people to be recorded both on this registry and that of other safety nets. However, as explained earlier, it may just be a reflection of the inexact understanding of the rules: should those who do not *personally* benefit or whose *household* does not benefit from any other safety nets be excluded? Moreover, in practice, those perceived benefiting from only minor safety nets such as the Primary Education Stipend may have been included anyway, as some Ministry officials expressed should be the case.

### ***Unskilled worker status***

The Implementation Guidelines also foresee the exclusion of those skilled. The in-depth study uncovered some exceptions where for example construction workers (*rajmistris*) had been included in the programme as it was felt that they also suffered seasonal unemployment, mainly as a consequence of farm workers' seasonal unemployment.

### ***Influence of personal ties and political factors***

Once the number of cards per ward had been decided, UP members largely used their own judgement to select which individuals should benefit from the programme. In depth interviews revealed a preference towards known people. This is confirmed by the econometric analysis based on the survey data which shows that being a close or distant relative of Union Parishad significantly increased the chances of being a participant and that people who felt they could seek assistance from Union Parishad members were also more likely to be beneficiaries<sup>21</sup>.

Another factor which was reported to have influenced the selection process was the upcoming UP election. Reportedly, in a number of cases, the 100-day EGP was used as a campaign tool using it as a means to strengthen the vote base of some.

While the Implementation Guidelines foresee interviews with pre-selected candidates, there is no evidence that they were held in four of the five areas where an in-depth study was carried out.

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<sup>20</sup> Thus in the regression analysis (Annex 6), we find that once we control for wealth, the dummy 'benefiting from another safety net' is significant in predicting participation to the 100-Day EGP.

<sup>21</sup> See Annex 6 for an econometric identification of the determinants of being a beneficiary in the 100-Day EGP.

Out of the five areas studied, only in one was a public meeting held with all the listed potential participants and some people excluded on physical inability grounds.

In spite of all these external factors influencing the beneficiary selection process, as shown below, the effectiveness of the targeting turned out to be satisfactory.

### ***Female participation***

In some cases, it was felt by the Ward members that women did not have the physical capacity to perform the types of works offered by the programme, thus leaving them out of the selection process. In one Union covered by the in-depth study, women were taken out of the programme by the UP after they had already started the work, arguing that they were not physically suited to carry out the job. Their beneficiary cards were not re-assigned. No unemployment benefit was given to them in compensation.

In more conservative areas, self-exclusion by women themselves was also reported as they felt it inappropriate to work alongside men. In some cases, women braved the cultural norm and were faced with great criticism for daring to want to join such a programme where they would have to work outside, with men, and with their heads uncovered. Reportedly, some UP Chairmen rejected female participation altogether on such grounds.



***Men and women digging earth***

Other factors restricting women's participation were the lack of transportation to the work site which was sometimes far, the absence of toilets, safe drinking water and food. All these made it difficult for women with small children in particular to join in this programme. It should be noted that following a similar observation in India, provisions have been made to provide such facilities<sup>22</sup>.

In spite of these constraints and without any administrative gender requirements, 28% of the beneficiaries in the first phase of

the 100-day EGP turned out to be women against 72% of men<sup>23</sup> which translates a strong need and demand by women to participate in such a programme. Indeed, 'only out of desperation would a Bangladeshi rural woman be willing to work with men at onerous, low-paying manual work labor' (IFPRI, 2007). The Indian Employment Guarantee Scheme requires that one third of the participants be women. Although this degree of participation may seem substantial in a

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<sup>22</sup> See Annex 2 for more details.

<sup>23</sup> These numbers are drawn from the nationally representative household survey carried out by BRAC for this study. It should be noted that the GoB monitoring information reports a 24% female participation, but the information is incomplete as a number of districts had failed to communicate their details by the time the final monitoring sheet was compiled.

context where just above 10% of women<sup>24</sup> (compared to above 80% for men) participate in the country's labour force (World Bank, 2008), the higher rates of poverty registered among certain types of female headed households -those where the male head of household is either dead or has left his spouse- (World Bank, 2008), may warrant a certain degree of female targeting for this programme.

- **Given the high proportion of women among the extreme population and their interest in participating in this programme, the Government may want to adopt a more focussed targeting on women. It should also address the gender constraints that women face in participating in the labour market more generally.**
- **The Government may want to ensure that the types of works to be carried out through this programme can be physically performed by women, and that ward members are actually convinced of this.**
- **Because certain socio-cultural norms seem to have gotten in the way of women joining the programme in more conservative areas, reserving some works for women exclusively may be considered to encourage female participation.**
- **If the decision is made to promote female participation, providing facilities in the work place such those present in the NREGA (crèche, drinking water, shade for children etc.) may be considered.**

One interesting finding from the in-depth qualitative study is that while this programme was to act as a relief from temporary unemployment, it did not just do that. In many cases, women do not work outside the homestead, and if they do, they rarely do so in the field, thus suffering less in proportion of seasonal unemployment. What the 100-Day EGP did for these women is to provide them an employment opportunity for the first time in their life.

### **5.3.2. Targeting effectiveness: Inclusion and exclusion errors**

The poverty outreach was measured using a Poverty Assessment Tool<sup>25</sup> and yielded the following results (Figure 6): about 37% of the beneficiaries were from the poorest quintile of the population and an additional 30.2% from the second lowest quartile. The extreme poor, main target of this programme, constitute the poorest quintile and a small part of the second one<sup>26</sup>. The two lowest quintiles may be considered as corresponding to the population living below the poverty line given that 40% of the population in Bangladesh is poor. Thus, while 67% of the benefits were captured by the poor, only just above 37% was captured by the extreme poor which questions the effectiveness of the targeting mechanism given the intended focus of the programme. Gross mistargeting occurred for 2.2% of the beneficiaries which belonged to the richest 20% of the population.


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<sup>24</sup> This statistic is based on the BBS HIES 2005. It should be noted that it differs quite substantially from the figure reported by the Labour Force Surveys (LFS): 26% in 2002/03. The difference may be partly due to the fact that HIES may not account fully for female unpaid work in crop and non-crop production, cottage industries, small trade and farming. Almost half of the women counted as economically active in LFS are unpaid family workers (World Bank, 2008).

<sup>25</sup> The CGAP Poverty Assessment Tool which was developed by IFPRI for CGAP was conceived to provide transparency on the depth of poverty outreach of MFIs. It provides rigorous data on the levels of poverty of clients/beneficiaries of a programme, relative to people within the same community through the construction of a multidimensional poverty index that allows for comparisons between programmes and across countries. For more details, go to: [http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2978/TechnicalTool\\_05\\_overview.pdf](http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2978/TechnicalTool_05_overview.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> According to BBS, when defined as those under the lower poverty line using the CBS method.

**Figure 6. Poverty outreach of the 100-Day EGP: % of beneficiaries and non beneficiaries by poverty quintile**



- **The list of beneficiaries may be purged from the obvious inclusion errors i.e. the individuals from the three richer quintiles. Identifying the beneficiaries from the higher poverty quintiles should be relatively straightforward for local communities.**
- **The Government may envisage making use of the National ID card number to reduce leakages and create database of beneficiaries which would also serve to avoid overlap with other SSNs.**

How does this compare to the poverty outreach of other programmes targeting the extreme poor? In 2007, IFPRI carried out a study on four programmes aimed at providing income transfers to the extreme poor: Income-Generating Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD), Food Security Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD), Food for Asset Creation (FFA) and Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP). The targeting effectiveness of these programmes was gauged by looking at the patterns of income distribution of participants. Although IFPRI uses BBS HIES 2005 per capita *expenditure deciles* rather than a poverty index as we do for the 100-Day EGP, we use this to get a sense of how well the 100-Day EGP performed compared to these other programmes (Table 3). While these programmes were incontestably much better at reaching the poorest group, the 100-Day EGP did not perform much worse in terms of reaching the moderate poor (67% of beneficiaries are poor against 71% in the FSVGD).

**Table 3. Distribution of programme beneficiary households by 2005 HIES per capita expenditure quintiles**

<b>per capita expenditure deciles</b>	<b>IGVGD</b>	<b>FSVGD</b>	<b>FFA</b>	<b>RMP</b>
Poorest quintile	54	53	81	59
2nd quintile	20	18	7	15
3rd quintile	13	16	4	14
4th quintile	7	8	5	8
Richest quintile	6	5	3	5
	100	100	100	100

The fact that only 37% of the beneficiaries belonged to the extreme poor group may be explained by a situation where little guidance and tools were given to field level officials as to how to

identify the extreme poor and where even the Implementation Guidelines were unclear as to whether *only* the extreme poor were to be targeted. 67% of the beneficiary households were poor which is more in line with targeting effectiveness observed in other safety nets.

Although the focus on the extreme poor was relatively limited, the food security levels of beneficiaries are found to have been significantly lower than the non-participant households. For example, 64% of the participant households reported spending at least one day without a fulfilling meal in the previous month compared to 44% of the non-participant households. This result is reassuring in that it shows that if the majority of participants did not fall in the group defined as extreme poor, they certainly constituted a big part of the food insecure.

It is expected that the market wage rate will have an important bearing on the targeting effectiveness in certain areas of the country given the differences that may exist between this rate and the 100 taka offered by the 100-Day EGP. While in some regions (e.g. Sirajganj), 100 taka was reported to be too little compared to the market rate leading less people to want to join, in others (e.g. Kurigram and Mymensingh), the demand expressed by individuals to be included in the programme was greater than what had been foreseen at the Ministry level. In some cases, the wage differential was too high and resulted in people dropping out of the programme. The response of the local implementers in some instances was to reduce the number of beneficiaries and boost the daily individual wage (in one of the field study locations for example, it was increased to 130 taka).

While it may be tempting to conclude from this that the wage offered under the programme should vary across the country as it does in the Indian NREGS where the minimum wages of different regions serve as a standard to set the wage for the Employment programme, the Bangladesh context would make this very difficult to implement. The country is small and well connected, and such a practice could translate into migration of individuals towards locations with higher wages defeating the purpose of the programme (although a minimum residency clause may serve to minimise this problem). It is also worth noting that, to the extent that the program intends to target the extreme poor, capping the wage rate ensures a degree of self selection, restricting the participation to those among the unemployed that have lower salary expectations or fewer opportunities to find an alternative, more attractive employment. People willing to accept a lower salary are likely to be the less skilled and among the poorest. When keeping the wage at 100 Tk per day results in not being able to find enough individuals willing to work to match the number of cards allocated in a given location, funds may be transferred to finance employment in areas where the demand for work at this given rate is higher.

A related aspect that needs further probing into is the difference between the rate offered by the 100-Day EGP and other SSNs. While this did not emerge as an issue during the first phase, the timing of the second phase is likely to bring about some challenges for the Government in that some SSNs offer substantially better rewards than the 100-Day EGP.


## **5.4. Selection of works**

### **5.4.1. Works identification process as per the Guidelines**

As for the beneficiaries, the list of works to be undertaken in the duration of the project was finalised by the end of August 2008. Close to 160,000 works were identified. Again, in this process, a lot was left to the community level authorities to decide, in an attempt to ensure local conditions were taken into account.

The MoFDM along with the Programme Steering Committee decided on the *types* of works that should be considered for this programme, as described in Section 7 of the Implementation Guidelines. Priority was to be given to activities supportive of agriculture production and was to include works such as pond/canal excavation/re-excavation, road/barrage construction/reconstruction, waste removal, afforestation and vegetable/grass cultivation on government land, and preparation of compost heaps. It is to be noted that the range of works envisaged is consistent with the National Food Policy (NFP) strategic provisions on agricultural development, which underscore investing in rural infrastructure.

**Figure 7. Selection of works, 100 Day EGP**



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Instructed via the relevant authorities, the Union Parishad went on to propose a list of projects to the Union Parishad Disaster Management Committee, based on consultations with stakeholders. This Committee made recommendations on the list of projects to be approved by the UNO. The upazila Disaster Management Committee finally published the list of approved projects (Figure 7).

#### 5.4.2. Types of works undertaken and suitability

##### *Links with local development actors and needs*

###### **Box 2. An innovative work selection process in Chilmari Upazila, Kurigram District**

After the fishery community became unable to repay a loan taken from the government for investment, the UNO decided to seize the opportunity offered by the 100-Day EGP: under this programme, he undertook a large-scale excavation for a pond. This would provide sufficient income for the fishery community to allow them to pay back the loan, and eventually become self-reliant. This project was fully supported by the upazila Fisher Officer.

In practice, the selection of project sites and works was made very hastily. Only in some cases was the selection of works done in consultation with relevant local experts such as Department of Agriculture and Water Development Board officials. In fact, one observation that arose from the in-depth qualitative assessment was that collaborating with experienced project implementers was very helpful in ensuring the good functioning of the programme. This was the case for

example in Sirajganj where dam repair work was implemented in collaboration with the Water Development Board.

In some Districts such as Sirajganj, NGOs were consulted on the selection of works. Other forms of NGO involvement were reported: for example in Sirajganj, NGOs were asked to report on the quality of the works carried out while in Kurigram, NGOs were invited to attend the bi-monthly upazila Committee Meetings.



*Lifting of graveyard grounds*

Overall, the selection process is rather *ad hoc* and not part of an integrated local development planning as is the practice in India for instance. Under the NREGA, an annual village plan is drawn by each Gram Panchayat, in consultation with Gram Sabhas, which are ultimately consolidated and approved at District level (Annex 7).

Interestingly, in a number of areas, large scale road constructions were favoured over

smaller projects such as heap compost making, as it had been understood that projects undertaken should last 100 days. The upcoming UP election seemed to have influenced the selection of the projects to be implemented by the programme: projects with more demonstration effect (e.g. road or mosque gate construction, as opposed to compost fertilizers preparation) were usually given preference. Some UP Chairmen felt that only by undertaking works whose outcome could be clearly seen would they be able to prove their accountability to the higher authorities and in particular the in-coming Government. Undertaking the activity like clearing of ponds with water hyacinths would leave little to show for. In some instances, it was felt that the selection of the works, even if it has a developmental impact, was biased in favour of those involved in selecting the works to be carried out.

- **The possibility of combining the works undertaken under the 100-day EGP with those of other programs, including NGO ones, may be considered, as this could promote fruitful synergies.**
- **Elaborating local development plans as foreseen in the Indian NREGA may be envisaged. This could be done as part as the wider Government agenda but would also benefit the planning of this particular programme.**

**Table 4. Distribution of works undertaken**

Type of work	Percentage of total works
Road/ barrage construction /re-construction	69.4%
Ground raising	12.3%
Compost heap preparation	9.8%
Digging /redigging ponds	3.3%
Garbage and water removal	1.8%
Drain digging	1.6%
Others	1.0%
Grass and vegetable cultivation	0.3%
Household base raising	0.3%
Reconstruction of houses affected by natural disasters	0.2%
Jatka catching prevention	0.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

The size of the works fluctuated with an average of two persons per work in Narayanganj for example, and 37 in Magura. The vast majority (69%) of the works undertaken consisted in road and barrage construction and reconstruction (Table 4). In terms of frequency, this was followed by ground raising (12%) and compost heap


preparation (10%). The distribution observed at the national level reflects the Divisional level situation to a large extent (

Figure 8).

In the Mymensingh district, the idea of using the rural labour mobilised for this programme to carry out very much needed works in the urban and peri-urban areas such as street cleaning was raised.

The developmental aspect of many of the works undertaken was evident. However, in spite of consultations with the local community and experts, project selection was not always appropriate. In some cases, roads were rebuilt using sandy earth rendering it vulnerable to rain. Thus, a stringent area-specific guideline for selecting project needs to be developed.

**Figure 8. Distribution of works undertaken by Division**



- **Consultations with local planners and communities should be encouraged to ensure the developmental aspect of the works undertaken.**
- **More detailed Guidelines could be developed regarding the type of works to be undertaken to maximize their developmental impact their developmental impact. Provisions to promoting consultation with local planners in the identification of the works could be included to maximize their impacts and synergies with other development interventions.**

***Timing and suitability to agro ecological conditions***

In deciding to carry out the programme at a national scale between September to end of November, it was implicitly assumed that the timing of the lean season was uniform throughout the country, albeit with some scope for flexibility with a 15 day option to delay the start of the programme. Another important assumption was that works of type to be carried out could physically be undertaken at that time in regions of the country. However, regional idiosyncrasies should have been taken into consideration in the design. Indeed, most of the *haor* areas remain under water during part of the selected period, allowing for little employment opportunities. A large part of the flood-prone areas in many districts also remain under water for a major part of this period. Given that most of the planned works related to construction and maintenance of rural infrastructure which involve earth works, major delays were experienced in the start of the programme. A comparable problem relating to the feasibility of the work relates to the fact that in *aman* growing areas, at the onset of the program, fields were still in use, providing little scope of earth digging to carry out the worked planned.

The result of this is that some of the works taken up could not be completed by the end of the first phase of the programme, 30<sup>th</sup> November. This late start has meant that on average, less than 60

days' work was in fact provided to the beneficiaries. Indeed, the average number of days for which work was given is 51<sup>27</sup> (or 85% of the allocated time for Phase 1). This has also meant that some of the works initiated could not be completed. In such cases, the Government has recommended that these works be given priority in the second phase of the programme. Some felt that some flexibility could be introduced by allowing work on Fridays and Saturdays in order to allow for the recovery of lost days.



100-Day EGP work signboard

While in some areas, some argued for the continuation of the programme to complete the planned 60 days' work, conversely, in others, notably in Mymensingh, Government officials were unanimous on the point that the programme should not be continued beyond mid-November because the target group of the 100-Day EGP coincided with those to be employed for harvesting *aman* paddy, at a higher wage rate. Interestingly, in Jamalpur, a reverse argument was made: it was estimated that the majority of women employed

by the 100-Day EGP (34% of the beneficiaries in this area) generally did not participate in the *aman* harvesting activities. The new crop could thus not be counted on to provide employment to this vulnerable group and the programme should be continued accordingly.

Another reason put forward to end the programme early was the clash with the preparation for the 29<sup>th</sup> December Parliamentary elections would also mean less time for supervision by the Government.

- **More flexibility should be given in the timing of the programme to take into account regional specificities.**

## 5.5. Fund release

### 5.5.1. Fund release mechanism as per the Guidelines

Although the allocation of funds in such a large scale programme could have been problematic, the Government has opted to use a system which has been operational on other programmes such as Cash-for-Work and which has proved effective in avoiding drawbacks associated with big transfers of funds between the capital and the rest of the country.

<sup>27</sup> This is based in the GoB Monitoring report dated 01/12/2008 which however, does not include the information for Narayanganj, Brahmanbaria, Manikganj, Khagrachori, Jessore, Kushtia, Jhalokathi and Kurigram upazilas.

Instructions are given from the General Accounts Officer (AO) in the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management to the upazila Accounts Officer via the District Accounts Officer to release a cheque in the name of the UNO and the Project Implementation Officer (PIO) who can encash it by depositing it at any Government scheduled bank in a new account jointly held by them (see Figure 9).

The Union Project Implementation Committee requests cash for projects to the upazila Project Implementation Officer. The upazila Project Implementation Officer verifies these cash requisitions recommends to UNO for payment who releases the funds as appropriate. Each Project Implementation Committee (PIC) will get a cheque from the UNO and PIO. The Chairman of the PIC then disburses the money to the labourers through the master payroll which is checked by a 'tag officer'. Payment should be made on a daily basis in cash. Each beneficiary signs a form on receipt of the money. This same form is signed by six different officials including the tag officer, the Project Implementation Officer and the UNO. Because each tag officer is responsible for all the projects under one union, it is physically impossible for him to be present during the daily payment of all works (as all works are likely to end towards the same time of the day). The Guidelines are thus not implementable in this respect.

- **Tag officers cannot oversee the daily payment of all beneficiaries as this would imply being present in different places at the same time. The Guidelines thus need to be reviewed regarding this.**

### **5.5.2. Actual fund allocation and disbursement processes**

#### *Administrative costs*

100 million taka out of the overall 20,000 million budget (0.5%) have been allocated for administrative and logistic costs. This amount is distributed as follows:

- 11,500,000 for the Programme Director's office (11.5%)
- 50,000 per district, for 64 districts (3%)
- 60,000 per upazila, for 480 upazilas (29%)
- 12,000 per union for 4,474 unions (54%).

The entire amount to be distributed was allocated for both phases and all disbursed at the beginning of the programme.

In terms of the disbursement of funds from the Ministry to the unions, the system adopted was one used before for example for the Cash-for-Work programme, avoiding problems associated with massive transfers of funds throughout the country. This procedure ensures all steps are checked by a higher authority to minimise leakage opportunities. However, the fieldwork revealed that in a number of cases<sup>28</sup>, the amount to be received by the upazila authorities towards the administration of the programme had only been received in early November, affecting the logistics and supervision of the work.

Related to this, the issue of a flat rate for upazila level administrative costs for all upazilas was questioned because some areas have to manage many more beneficiaries and works than others. Substantial differentials in the administrative amount allocated per beneficiary exist: in Phulpur upazila, Mymensingh, 4.8 taka are allocated per individual for the entire duration of the programme against, at the other extreme, 255 taka in Rowangchhari upazila, Bandarban. While

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<sup>28</sup> This was the case in all the upazilas under the four districts in which qualitative studies were carried out.

the average number of works undertaken per union was 34, this varied from 9 in Magura for example to 66 in Sherpur with obvious logistical (and therefore cost) implications.

- **The sums allocated to cover administrative costs need to be made available as soon as the preparation for the programme begins.**
- **Taking into account the number of beneficiaries and works undertaken per upazila may be considered in the allocation of administrative funds of the programme given the important differences that exist.**

### *Wage payment*

Because the system tries to minimise the opportunities for misuse of funds, the transactions costs involved are substantial. In particular, the fact that every single daily payment of the benefit involves a form to be signed by six officials mobilises immense resources (a theoretical 1.2 billion signatures over the life of the programme just for the payment of the benefits). The Steering Committee's attention was drawn to this problem but it was decided not to change the system for the time being, for fear of misuse of funds. Yet, faced with such a heavy administrative load which in addition was not always matched by the appropriate financial and human resources, in practice, the payments often ended up not taking place on a daily basis: on bi-weekly or even weekly basis, as is the case in the Indian NREGS (see Annex 7 for more details).

- **The additional administrative load implied by the implementation of this new programme needs to be matched by adequate additional human resources, particularly at the Upazila and Union levels.**

Another important finding was that the signature or fingerprint of a large number of beneficiaries was not always taken at the time of payment, leaving much scope for misallocation of funds. The fact that many beneficiaries reported not having a participant card tends to indicate the same. In effect, it was found that the number of names in the master role book was frequently higher than that of the number of workers actually present at the project site. In the five areas studied in depth by the qualitative researchers, an average of 10% of the people on the master roll either did not exist or were unaware that their name was on the list.

- **A more efficient system for the payment of labourers than the one in place currently needs to be devised while ensuring leakages are kept to a minimum. The daily payment of wages has turned out to be unfeasible in many areas and should thus be reviewed. Weekly payment such as in the Indian programme may be considered (see Annex 7).**
- **While a number of procedures were designed to ensure greater control and transparency, these do not seem to have been followed systematically. Additional or more efficient control measures need to be put in place.**

### *Unemployment benefit*

The Guidelines of the programme foresee an unemployment benefit to be paid if a registered person cannot be given any work within 15 days of registration. At the onset of the first phase of the 100-Day EGP, this provision was perceived critically by many in that it seemed to give too much opportunity for mishandling of funds. In practice, only one district, Netrokona, distributed this benefit. The in depth-study carried out revealed a pervasive lack of understanding of how the unemployment benefit should function, both on the beneficiary side and on the UP members and

Chairman side, which would explain why it was left out altogether except for this exception. In fact, in all the Unions covered by the in depth study, it was reported that the Upazila office had given indication to avoid disseminating information to the beneficiaries regarding the existence of this benefit, as it was feared people would decide to live off it, rather than work.

- **The unemployment benefit was perceived by many as problematic in that it could open the way to mishandling of funds. Additional information and training on its rationale on how it should be handled may be provided to field level officials if the unemployment benefit needs to be continued.**
- **Social acceptability and an in depth assessment of manageability of the unemployment benefit should be further investigated and options for correct management formulated, if the unemployment benefit is to be part of future programmes.**

## **5.6. Monitoring**

### **5.6.1. Monitoring plan**

The Implementation Guidelines of the 100-Day EGP propose a number of measures to monitor the execution of the programme (Figure 9).

The Project Implementation Committee (PIC) was to have an essential role in maintaining the master roll and acknowledgements of the receipt of labour wage for the money received under the project. Upon completion of the project, the PIC would send a report along with the implemented master roll bill/voucher to the upazila PIC within fifteen days of project completion for audit purposes.

At the upazila level, the upazila Disaster Management Committee was to monitor the implementation of programme to send monthly progress reports to the District Commissioner (DC) and the Ministry. The UNO would appoint a tag officer whose role was to monitor the works of one union. The PIC would assist him in this.


The District Relief and Rehabilitation Officer (DRRO) was to send a consolidated monthly project progress reports of all the upazilas under the district to the MoFDM. Besides, DRRO would supervise programmes/project under the district and send final report of the projects to the concerned cell of the MoFDM within the scheduled date. Concurrently, at the district level, the District Disaster Management Committee would prepare a permanent evaluation and monitoring system: each month of a year after beginning of the programme all activities under this programme would be recommended for implementation to the upazila committee after monitoring and evaluation. The District Disaster Management Committee would examine the progress of all projects under the programme and would arrange their implementation. This Committee was also supposed to prepare a monthly report on the activities related to implementation of programme and send them to the Steering Committee with suggestions.

At the level of the Ministry, a Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management was responsible for the monitoring of the programme and the Steering Committee was ultimately responsible for ensuring that the monitoring take place.

As described so far, the design of the 100-Day EGP involves a substantial number of actors at all levels and is quite complex in the linkages that exist between them. This complexity in the design

may be partly explained by the Government's will to establish supportive and checking mechanisms to ensure a fair and transparent system. At times, this may have translated into overburdened systems which have difficulty in functioning or which have ended up diverging from the Guidelines to adapt to the realities of the field.

**Figure 9. Implementation/Monitoring of works, 100 Day EGP**



## 5.6.2. Monitoring performance

As described in the previous section, the monitoring procedure foreseen for the programme was complex. Some divergences from the Guidelines were observed and the underlying reasons behind these adaptations may give a clue as to necessary adjustments for the second phase.

As planned in the Guidelines, the DC of each district set up a District Disaster Management Committee headed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner to supervise and monitor the Programme. He reported to the DC with regular information. The Project Director did not receive the reports given to the DC but received telephonic updates on a regular basis. However, DCs were requested to send him a summary report after completion of each project. At the upazila level, as per the Guidelines, the upazila Disaster Management Committee was supposed to send monthly progress reports to the Ministry. Once the programme began, it quickly became clear this would prove too cumbersome for the Ministry. Thus, the reports were sent only to the DC.

District-level data were sent on a daily basis to Dhaka, both to the PD's office and to a Deputy Secretary in the Ministry who in turn compiled a Daily Achievement Report (see Annex 8). There seems to have been duplication of effort in the production of the Daily Achievement Report. This could be easily avoided through greater coordination.

- **Enhanced coordination at the Ministry level would mobilise less resources for monitoring purposes.**

### *Quality and timeliness of information*

The Daily Achievement Report contains district wise information on the number of registered beneficiaries, the number of works identified and works started, the total amount allocated for Phase 1, the total number of upazilas in the district and the total number of upazilas where the works have started, the total number of female and male workers, total number of man and woman days worked, amount of unemployment allowance given, total expenditure so far, total money not yet spent, number of projects ended and percentage of the programme achieved (in terms of spending).

While this information is interesting, an important part of it seemed redundant after a few days of beginning the programme and would be more suited to a weekly/monthly report. For instance, the number of registered beneficiaries, or projects started varied in the beginning but rapidly reached their optimum after which no more variation could be observed. The same applies to the total number of female and male labourers. Instead, these data could have been gathered on less frequent basis –thus liberating some already overstretched resources- while adding other indicators such as the expenditure incurred on wages, material and administration. Another example from the India NREGS, is the grievance redressal performance of all involved institutions which is monitored on a weekly basis. As Grosh *et al* (2008) warn, ‘as the implementation of a monitoring system entails costs, collecting only information that decision makers need or that is needed to ensure an adequate level of accountability in relation to stakeholders is important.’

In some areas such as Siranjanj, because they had failed to receive official instructions on how to monitor, some UNOs proved very innovative in developing monitoring materials. Use could be made of these type of initiatives based on field experience in the elaboration of future monitoring formats, through consultations of field staff.

- **On the one hand, the contents and frequency of the information sent on a daily basis from the districts to Dhaka may be reviewed as not all of it is useful. On the other hand, additional elements could be included to understand the progress of the program.**
- **Inputs should be obtained from field level staff as to which elements the monitoring should focus on.**

In addition to the daily reporting back to the Ministry, more *ad hoc* forms of monitoring took place: the MoFDM sent 17 officials to the field on two occasions to carry out a quick assessment of the implementation progress. Reports were delivered to the higher authorities each time. Although these reports were not made available for the purpose of this study, it is reported that no



*Ministry officials visiting a 100-Day EGP work site*

detailed guidelines were given to these officials for their mission. While such *ad hoc* visits are certainly helpful to give a sense of the evolution of the program, providing some structure to the visit would be more fruitful.

Besides the spot visits by higher officials involved in the programme, the Ministry of Finance also carried out field visits. Unfortunately, the result of these trips was not systematically shared with those directly involved in the implementation.

- ***Ad hoc* monitoring activities may be more structured to ensure a greater use is made of their outcome.**

### ***Information and Communication Technology***

It was observed that email communication was inexistent, although most district offices are connected to the internet. Although this is at times explained by electricity disruption or the lack of a telephone connection, it is mostly due to a lack of technical capacity. Thus, information from upazila was received by telephone or messenger, while information from the district to the Ministry was sent by telephone or fax which then had to be entered electronically.

- **Relevant computer training would go a long way in ensuring regular monitoring at all administrative levels from the grassroots to the Ministry. A basic training in the use of internet along with an assured internet connection would have to be ensured.**

### ***Human resources and constraints***

One clear remark based on field observations is that monitoring activities monopolised a great amount of human resources, not always matched by the financial resources available. For example, the DRRO from districts such as Mymensingh which have 12 upazilas, needed to be

#### **Box 3. Tag officers' load**

Tag officers have the huge task of monitoring all works under one union. This entails constant travelling on their motorbikes to reach the work sites. Yet, no allocation has been made to cover their additional fuel cost, at least in the four district visited as part of this study.

constantly on the road if they were to make regular visits to monitor the implementation of the programme. Those responsible for monitoring at the Union level were often already extremely busy with other safety nets such as the VGF or VGD. Tag officers were responsible for observing and monitoring all the works under one union, or in other words, nine wards (Box 3).

In addition to Tag officers, others officials had to be engaged in supervision work: in Kurigram, Family Planning Assistants and Primary School Head masters for example were found performing such tasks. Although allocations were made at all administrative levels for the additional duties incurred due to the 100-day EGP, a common complaint was that the resources made available were lacking given the extent of the task. In particular, the scarcity of human resources, both in quantity and in quality (in particular the lack of personnel able to use computers and the email) was seen as a real setback. The qualitative interviews show that the administrative burden unmatched by appropriate compensation, at times, lead to inadequate monitoring.

#### **Box 4. An example of good practices in a very remote haor of Kishorganj district**

Faced with the overburdening of the supervising officers, a local UNO decided to appoint a single person per project site. He recruited local volunteers to serve as monitors. These individuals were asked to record everything they noticed, from inefficiencies to good practices.

This reported deficiency in resources (see Box 3) was exacerbated by the delay in the receipt of the allocated amounts towards administrative costs and heavily constrained supervision and monitoring of the field project works (see Section 5.5.2.).

## **5.7. Accountability mechanisms and transparency**

### ***Grievances***

The lack of adequate preparation for the 100-Day EGP not only affected those implementing the programme at the field level but also the potential beneficiaries. Indeed, unaware of the official criteria on which the selection of beneficiaries would be based, it was difficult for anyone to challenge the decisions taken. While many thought to complain, they were unsure as to how to go about it.

In some cases, the lack of understanding of the programme translated in people's discontentment: because they were employed at the time of the beneficiary selection, they were not eligible and showed no interest in joining the programme. Once they became unemployed, they turned to the UP Chairman who had to turn them down.

Because of the design of the programme which covers 5% of the extreme poor in each region, by definition, eligible people will be excluded, with inevitable disgruntlement by those left out.

Given this, many people are likely to complain. Yet, the Government cannot take action merely because someone eligible has not been given a participant card, but only because he/she has been excluded while someone who is not eligible has been included.

Nevertheless, the issue of grievances was taken very seriously at the Ministry level and UNOs were advised to follow all complaints by an enquiry. Newspaper allegations were also to be checked systematically. At the second Steering Committee meeting, the decision to document everything, including complaints, was taken. No centralized system to register the complaints was established however.

A major flaw in the system in place is that in the case of a complaint, UNOs are generally asked by the DCs to investigate. The involvement in identifying wrong-doings by an officer so central in the entire selection process might involve a conflict of interest and may reduce the objectivity of the outcome of the investigation.

The in-depth qualitative study gathered information on a number of irregularities for which, even though attempts were made to complain, no grievance was recorded. Some women reported not having been given work in spite of being on the beneficiary list and seeing their complaints unheard. Others had reportedly been informed that this programme did not include women and were also unable to make their grievances heard.

Beneficiaries pointed out to the difficulty in presenting present their grievances and obtain a satisfactory redressal. But the lack of guidance on appropriate redressal measures to act upon was also felt at times by the implementers. For example, if people only worked part of the day instead of the planned seven hours, what should be done?

- **A more systematic mechanism to deal with grievances should be put in place.**
- **The Government cannot investigate exclusions from the programme as the design of the programme is such that not everyone can be included: it needs to concentrate on the wrong inclusions.**
- **The Implementation Guidelines should include detailed procedures on how to deal with digressions both from the implementers of and participants to the programme to ensure consistency across the country.**

### ***Irregularities***

Irregularities have been reported in the press and our in-depth qualitative interviews also uncovered some examples. BRAC's Social Development Programme also collected some information on this matter through its *palli samaj*. Table 5 gives examples of observed forms of misappropriation. The most common irregularities concern the payment and actual provision of work. In the first instance, the beneficiary was not given 100 taka for each day laboured or was given money for less days than those actually worked. Delays in the payment and even altogether lack of payment were registered. The delay in the payment was often due to time constraints given the additional paperwork associated with the withdrawal of funds from the bank.

In the second instance, it has been reported that work was given for less than 60 days or was not given to all listed beneficiaries while individuals not figuring on the pay roll were employed. Successful resolutions of these problems involved UNOs and other Government officials, police, journalists and grass root organizations such as the *palli samaj*. At times, collective protest of the workers was effective in obtaining their due.

**Table 5. Examples of registered irregularities reported by the *palli samaj***

Nature of irregularities	Description
Irregularities in paying wages	Giving less than 100 taka/day to the workers (80 to 90 taka)
	Giving money for less number of days than the actual number of days for which a worker has worked
	Not paying the workers on time
	Not paying any money
	Not giving unemployment allowance
Drawing false bills	Drawing money through false list of workers
	Drawing money by showing false attendance
	Drawing false bill without giving work
Irregularities in giving work	Giving work for less days (2-3 days instead of 5 days/week)
	Not giving work to all enlisted workers
	Giving work to people who have not been enlisted for the programme
	Not giving work regularly
	Giving less work to women
	Engaging in member's personal work
	Stopping work
Not giving cards	Not giving cards to the enlisted workers
Taking signatures in the master roll without mentioning the amount of money	

Source: Compilation of *palli samaj* records by the BRAC Social Development Programme

### ***Transparency***

The Government decision to follow up on all complaints in one form or another signals an intention to maximize transparency of the procedures. Other efforts towards ensuring transparency were made (albeit late) with the posting of the Implementation Guidelines on the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management website. Following the end of the first phase, the final Achievement Report was also posted there<sup>29</sup>. This is in line with what is practiced for the Indian NREGA (see Annex 7 for more details). Immense efforts have been made in India to ensure transparency following numerous years of experimentation. Extensive information on the programme and on its implementation is available on the internet but can also be obtained through other means. These practices may give some ideas to the Government on how to increase its transparency. Efforts should also be made internally with different branches of the Government communicating the results of their monitoring activities to each other.

- **Conclusions reached from the monitoring activities carried out by different Government cells should be shared with all involved parties.**
- **Regular information on the monitoring of the programme should be made available to the public, for example through regular posting on the internet. .**

### **5.8. Comparison with the India National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)**

While programmes need to be tailored to the local context, comparison the 100-Day EGP seems pertinent given India's long-standing experience with rural employment schemes and because the implementation guidelines laid down in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act -NREGA

<sup>29</sup> See <http://www.mofdm.gov.bd/100%20Day%20Employment%20Generation%20Program.htm>.

(Government of India, 2008a)<sup>30</sup> consolidate much of this experience. Although the Indian scheme appears more refined than the 100-day EGP, field evidence shows that the implementation performance varies widely between Indian states, depending notably on local planning, implementation and monitoring capacities.

The objectives of the 100-day EGP and the Indian NREGA are quite similar in essence, emphasizing employment provision for poor and vulnerable people linked to rural infrastructure development. However, because the 100-day EGP is essentially conceived as a short term, time-bound intervention, the programme also intends to address immediate issues such as the loss of purchasing power due to the food price crisis. Annex 7 offers a systematic review of the commonalities and differences between the two countries' programmes.

## 6. PROGRAMME IMPACTS AS PERCEIVED BY BENEFICIARIES

To the extent that the full impact of any programme can only be gauged upon completion, this section limits itself to an assessment of people's expectations of the possible impacts by the end of the entire programme but also about the long term impacts of the programme and the sustainability of these effects.

Results on the initial perceived impact of the programme are very encouraging: more than three-fourths of the participants reported an improvement in their overall economic condition thanks to the programme. As one would expect, the poorer the household of the beneficiary, the more this positive effect is felt. 77% of participant households reported an improvement in their food consumption, either in terms of quality, or quantity, or both. Other preliminary results show that the 100-day EGP has allowed a number of households to repay loans previously taken from NGOs. Investment in household assets thanks to the programme was reported for some and plans were being made for the future. These planned assets are both productive (calves, goats, chicken) and non productive (savings for the dowry). This give a sense of how much the programme is being relied on by the beneficiaries to sustain their livelihoods in the future. Indeed, there was a general consensus among beneficiaries that the programme should continue. Another important result of the study was that for many (30% of the beneficiaries covered in the in-depth study, i.e. 160), joining this programme had prevented them from migrating to find employment.

For many, this programme was preferred to any form of safety net not requiring work: the dignity and respect that came from earning income through hard work outweighed the benefits of charity in the eyes of the beneficiaries. Beyond the security of an income during 100 days in the year, the 100-Day EGP gave beneficiaries some credibility with shop owners for example, who now agreed to give credit to them.

### **Box 5. Women's work before they joined the 100-Day EGP**

For many women who joined the programme, this was their first experience in paid work. Others had worked as maids or made *kanthas* (quilted blankets) for 250-300 taka per three or four weeks.

The programme was particularly helpful to women who often, unlike men, are unable to migrate for better work opportunities. As mentioned earlier, this was for many women their first

<sup>30</sup> The NREGA is the central Act providing legal guarantee of employment, which the different States of India are expected to implement through framing Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes (REGS), according to the minimum set of rules set forth in the NREGA.

remunerated work opportunity. To many, this was a source of empowerment as they gained self confidence and as the income from their work fed their families.

Unexpected impacts were social ones. Because by design, only a small proportion of the extreme poor in each upazila were covered by the programme, conflicts arose between those competing to become beneficiaries, thus disturbing the social harmony. Conversely, beneficiaries reported that the programme fostered a sense of group community among them as they felt their joint work would impact their lives and that of the community at large.

The limited publicity on the programme not only affected the programme because of the limited preparation and understanding of the Guidelines by the officials in charge. It also affected beneficiaries' perception of the programme which in turn impacted on the quality of the work done. The in-depth qualitative study found that programme recipients as well as villagers at large seemed to have missed the 'employment' aspect of the programme. Instead, they considered the programme as another relief programme where citizens act as passive beneficiaries instead of active employees. Consequently, this affected the progress of projects in many areas. Pabna for example reports a rate of achievement of only 43%.

## **7. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINE TUNING THE PROGRAM DESIGN AND ENHANCING IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE SECOND PHASE**

Faced with the drastic decline in the purchasing power experienced by the population during the 2008 price hike, the Government reacted swiftly by designing the 100-Day EGP to ensure the survival of those already in extreme poverty. The outcome of the first phase of this programme is encouraging, with a majority of beneficiaries- and notably women- reporting positive impacts – including long term impacts such investment in productive assets. The media have been very positive with some newspapers reporting no *monga* this year in some typically *monga*-prone areas<sup>31</sup>. The programme has been only relatively successful in targeting the extreme poor which, in part, may be explained by some confusion over the selection criteria and little preparation of the field officials. The outreach to the poor (as opposed to the extreme poor) is reasonably good however, and compares to that of other similar safety net programmes.

As expected with a programme of this scale, the programme suffered some weaknesses, as described throughout this report. In the following, recommendations to deal with these drawbacks and improve to the programme outcomes are split into those that may be taken into account in the run up to the second phase of the programme, and those that may be considered if the programme is to be repeated in the future.

### **7.1. Recommendations for the short term**

#### **Preparation**

1. The Government may consider producing a leaflet or booklet responding to 'Frequently Asked Questions' in order to clarify doubts that the general population and field-level officials may still have on objectives and modalities of the programme. The document(s) may be widely circulated on paper and through the internet.

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<sup>31</sup> See for example the article in The Independent, Bangladesh dated November 15<sup>th</sup> 2008 entitled: 'No *monga* in Rangpur, Dinajpur this year'.

2. Workshops may be organised at the field level to raise awareness on the programme of the general population and discuss implementation issues with the government officers involved.

### **Objectives of the programme and intended beneficiaries**

3. To the extent possible given the short time left before the beginning of the second phase of the programme, the list of beneficiaries may be purged from the obvious inclusion errors i.e. the individuals from the richer quintiles. Identifying the richer beneficiaries should be relatively straightforward for local communities.

### **Selection of the works**

4. Local authorities could be authorized to implement residual working days from the first phase during the second phase. For example, works may start earlier, may continue during weekends or be completed beyond the official end of the second phase, if this does not create a competing demand for labour in agriculture at harvest time.

### **Financing**

5. Given the scale of the programme, the system of daily payment of wages may be reconsidered as it is costly and unmanageable. Bi-weekly or weekly payment such as in the Indian Employment Guarantee Scheme may be considered after checking whether this meets the needs of the ultra poor who often, are only able to buy food after receiving their daily wage.
6. Additional human and financial resources may be allocated for the administration of the program in order to match the work load increase.

### **Monitoring**

7. There is scope for improvement in the contents of the monitoring information collected by the Government as well in the effectiveness of the monitoring processes. In the short run, the frequency of the Daily Achievement Report may be decreased to a weekly basis for example.
8. Greater collaboration at the Ministry level would minimise duplication of work and ensure greater transparency.

## **7.2. Recommendations in case the programme is repeated**

In the longer run, the outreach and outcome of the programme can be enhanced acting on the following priority areas of intervention. For each priority area, specific measures are suggested.

### **1. Rethink the aim of the programme and ensure consistency between its different objectives**

- In order to maximize the impact of limited financial resources, the Government may restrict the objectives by, for example, focusing *only* on certain regions. Geographical targeting may be considered if the aim is to tackle seasonal unemployment. If specific focus is intended for certain areas of the country, the percentage of extreme poor to be covered in those areas should be increased relative to percentage of extreme poor covered in other areas. However, the decision to give priority to the extreme poor in specific areas should be carefully assessed based on considerations such as: concentration, severity and persistence of poverty over time, as well as considerations regarding the existence of other safety nets and anti poverty interventions in the area.
- The various objectives of the programme may be reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with each other.
- Consistency between the objectives of the Programme and the method through which the number of beneficiary cards per district is allocated needs to be ensured.

- The Government should maximize coordination between the 100 day EGP and other safety nets as well as with non government programmes, in such a way as to maximize complementarities, exploit synergies and reduce duplication of efforts.

## ***2. Review programme intended beneficiaries and their characteristics***

- The beneficiary selection criteria should be reassessed to make them consistent with the programme objectives.
- Some flexibility may be introduced in terms of intra-household labour allocation. For instance, it may consider changing the beneficiary unit of the programme to the household rather than the individual, as it the case for the India NREGA.
- The age selection criterion may be adjusted to allow for able-bodied individuals excluded from other safety nets to join the programme.
- The Government may consider explicitly listing other programmes (Government and possibly non Government), participation in which will constitute an exclusion factor for the 100-Day EGP.
- The Government may envisage making use of the National ID card number to reduce leakages and create database of beneficiaries which would also serve to avoid overlap with other SSNs.
- Following the India approach, the Government may want to reconsider the selection process introducing a self selection mechanism whereby individuals would apply to join the programme and the Government administration would then exclude those that are not eligible.
- Government may consider defining a mechanism for excluding beneficiaries that are absent for a given number of days (and not replaced by an alternate member of the same household) as a way to allow alternative beneficiaries most committed to work (and/or more in need) to replace beneficiaries that do not fully participate in the program. This could constitute a tool for reinforcing the targeting toward those most in need of employment.
- Given the high proportion of women among the extreme population and their interest in participating in this programme, the Government may want to adopt a more focussed targeting on women, possibly introducing a minimum quota for women participation.

## ***3. Ensure better preparation of those implementing the programme and greater understanding of the programme by the local communities***

- Guidelines should be reviewed to ensure maximum possible clarity.
- More time must be dedicated to preparing all those involved in the implementation and ensure a common understanding of programme processes, by providing them necessary training.
- Social acceptability and an in depth assessment of manageability of the unemployment benefit should be further investigated and options for correct management formulated, if the unemployment benefit is to be part of future programmes.
- The modus operandi of the unemployment benefit needs to be made clear to all so that it can actually be used when necessary. Public awareness and training of all officers involved in implementation are also essential. The experience of India in the delivery of benefits may be considered.

## ***4. Adapt the choice of works to be carried out to the local needs and context.***

- More flexibility could be introduced in a number of aspects of the programme to take into account regional diversity in work opportunities and agro ecological conditions. This includes the type of work to be carried out and timing of implementation.

- Additional efforts could be made to integrate the works undertaken under the programme in local development plans to enhance their developmental impact. Association with pre-existing programmes (whether GoB or NGO) may be considered as an option in this respect.
- Where applicable, flexibility should be given for work to be carried out in municipal areas, taking labourers from the adjacent rural areas.
- More detailed Guidelines could be developed regarding the type of works to be undertaken to maximize their developmental impact. Provisions to promoting consultation with local planning initiatives in the identification of the works could be included to maximize their impacts and synergies with other development interventions.
- Elaborating local development plans as foreseen in the Indian NREGA may be envisaged. This could be done as part as the wider Government agenda but would also benefit the planning of this particular programme.
- The Government may want to ensure that the types of works to be carried out through this programme can be physically performed by women, and that ward members are actually convinced of this.
- If the decision is made to promote female participation, providing facilities in the work place such those present in the NREGA (crèche, drinking water, shade for children etc.) may be considered.

***5. Ensure local level administrations have adequate personnel and funds to implement the programme.***

- The sums allocated to cover administrative costs need to be made available as soon as the preparation for the programme begins.
- Adjustments to the funds allocated towards additional administrative costs may be made to take into account differences in the number of beneficiaries and works undertaken per administrative unit.

***6. Assess and enhance the monitoring system.***

- The assessment should look into variables to be monitored, duplication of work and possibilities for collaboration between different departments of the Ministry.
- The contents and frequency of the information collected should be reviewed.

***7. Ensure systematic recording and redressal of grievances.***

- A more systematic method of grievance recording and redressal may be put in place.
- Guidelines may be developed as to how to deal with the grievances uniformly.

**8. FOLLOW UP TO THIS STUDY**

This study responds to a time-bound request for advice for the Government. By nature, a mid-term review, it is restricted in its scope. The limited time available to carry out the study on such a large programme has meant that some findings could not be explored in depth. The survey, although nationally representative, is not statistically representative at lower geographical units, which means geographical disaggregation and comparison of results has been limited.

Another important drawback linked to the time constraint has been the lack of focus on any potential initial meso-level the effects of the 100-Day EGP, in particular the changes that it may have brought to the local economies. These effects are bound to take more time to materialise and are thus more suited to a follow up study, following the second phase of the programme.

As the second phase of the 100-Day EGP is under preparation, in order to assess the impact of the programme, the following activities would need to be undertaken:

- Two surveys similar to the one carried out for this study, one in April- May 2009 to cover the second lean season and time of the second phase of the programme, and one in October-November 2009. This latter is required to understand the possible longer term impacts of the 100-Day EGP. An effort would be made to ensure a sampling that would allow significant comparisons between regions.
- A continuation of the in depth qualitative study to evaluate the implementation process from Ministry level down to *upazilla*, union, and village levels.
- A component of the study that would focus on the developmental impact of the programme with, among others, possible effects on the local economy. The relevance of the works undertaken for the area where they are being undertaken, and the quality of their outcome would be looked at in detail.
- An analytical effort to better understanding whether the flat wage rate across the country is suited to the context or whether the design should be rethought and made contingent on the local market wage rate as it is in the India scheme. Further probing the adequacy of the wage rate is also important with regards to the existence of the other SSNs which compete with the 100-Day EGP in terms what they provide to beneficiaries.

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## 9. ANNEXES

### Annex 1. Check list used for interviews at the Ministry and district level

#### *a. Review of the implementation design*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Who (level) are the national/district level monitoring team members? Who is the focal point for monitoring at the MoFDM? Who else is involved in keeping records?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obtain organogramme</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there a budget allocated for monitoring of the programme? What amount and proportion of the total programme budget?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there a district level plan of action, who has prepared it?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If so, obtain it.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lines of control and communication between national and district levels: How is the linkage for monitoring developed with the district level officials? Frequency of visits by national team member to district. Periodicity of information flow. Hand delivery, post, email, telephonic communication?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Data and information storage (national, district levels). Who updates the information?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obtain all tools developed for input of monitoring data</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there any provision in the monitoring to help to differentiate the beneficiaries from those covered under other safety net programmes?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is any monitoring done through structured questionnaires, interviews, meetings, telephone discussions, focus group discussions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If so, obtain any tools used for this</li> </ul>

#### *b. Assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation*

##### *Targeting*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How were those involved instructed on how to select the beneficiaries?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obtain all information sent from the MoFDM to districts and further down regarding the selection of beneficiaries (Guidelines plus all additional circulars and related documents)</li> </ul>
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##### *Delivery*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the instructions for the selection of works? Were ministries other than the MOFDM involved? Which and how?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Obtain all information sent from the MoFDM</li> </ul>
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Was there any consultation with union level committee/community chairman/women groups/head of village for work to be done? Any linkage of the work identified with development needs of that village or upazila?	and other relevant ministries to districts and further down regarding the selection of beneficiaries (Guidelines plus all additional circulars and anything else)
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● How was the allocation and disbursement of funds organized? How did the MoFDM coordinate with the MoF? Was dealing with such substantial amounts of money a problem?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Has there been shortage of funds for disbursement of the programme/were funds disbursed as planned?</li> </ul>	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● How are job cards issued? How many days were taken for each district to issue these cards? When were the job cards issued? Format of job card. Is a photo of the beneficiary required on the card? Are the photographs paid for by GoB or have the beneficiaries to pay for it? Who keeps the job card?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● See a job card</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Are attendance records verified by the district level team? Is this done on daily basis, what is the frequency? Is there a database?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Obtain existing information</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● What instructions were given to beneficiaries? By whom and how?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● How was the work allocated? How decided on this allocation? Is the choice given to beneficiaries on the type of work they want? Is the work allocated based on suitability for beneficiary? Are these works in accordance with the Government priorities?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Is there a time limit/deadline for work completion of the works? Work timing? What is provided to the beneficiaries (tools for example)?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Is the work contracted out and if yes, are NGOs involved or the Government only involved?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● If so, what are the terms of the partnership: find any documentation</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● What are the modalities of payment to beneficiaries? Frequency? In cash? Everyone the same day? Are receipts taken from beneficiaries for payment disbursed? How are the payment records kept?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● How are the grievances recorded? Is there grievance redressal and taking action measures at field/upazila/district/national level immediately or for future? Accidents at work site/occupational hazards: is there any provision for compensation? Is this being monitored?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● See examples of such records if they exist</li> </ul>

**Monitoring**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Who is responsible for receiving, compiling and tabulating the monitoring data and preparing the monitoring reports? Who supervises the work being carried out and completed? Is there a technical team assigned for analysis of monitoring information? Is it a multi disciplinary team?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Obtain monitoring reports and any available other outputs</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Are the works carried out in the field technically supervised? By whom?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Is the staff adequate in quantity and qualifications (at national and field level)? Is the infrastructure adequate for this monitoring (supervisors, staff, computers etc)? Is there adequate storage space of monitoring records? Are duplicate copies maintained?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Find out the ratio of upazila level supervisor to beneficiaries</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Has any orientation or preparatory training been given to national, district, upazila and union level functionaries on information gathering and collection? Has any orientation been done for national monitoring team members on the programme monitoring ?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Are the beneficiaries given any number? Who designates these numbers and how? Is there an indexing and documentation system? Is there a central record of these numbers? If yes, what is done with this and how is this information used to match with coverage reached?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● How is the money disbursement to beneficiaries verified at field levels?</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● With whom are the monitoring reports shared discussion and finalization? (e.g does Joint Secretary have a role?)</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● In case of faulty information flow and poor accountability, what remedial actions are taken?</li> </ul>	

**Annex 2. NFPCSP's interviews**

***List of officials met at the Ministry level***

- AMM Shawkat Ali, Food Advisor
- Shafiqul Islam, Joint Secretary, Ministry of the Food and Disaster Management
- Mohammad Abdul Wazed, Project Director of the 100-day EGP
- Arastoo Khan, Joint Secretary, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance
- Rahima Begum, Senior Assistant Secretary, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance
- Munir Chowdhury, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of the Food and Disaster Management

***List of officials and others met in Jamalpur***

- Md. Abdul Mabud, Deputy Commissioner, Jamalpur
- Md. Jahangir Alam, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jamalpur
- Khondokar Lutfur Rahman, Assistant District Adjudant, Ansar & village Defence Party, Jamalpur

- Jasim Uddin Ahmed, Additional Director Agricultural Extension, Jamalpur
- Zakirul Islam Peter, Assistant Inspector on behalf of District Education Officer, Jamalpur
- Shireen Akhter, Additional District Livestock Officer, Jamalpur
- Md. Liaquat Ali on behalf of the District Fisheries Officer, Jamalpur
- Md. Abdus Sattar, Assistant Director
- Md. Fazlul Hoque Mallick, DRRO, Jamalpur
- S. M. Aatur Rahman, Sub Divisional Engineer, Water Development Board, Jamalpur
- Md. Abdul Kader, Assistant Engineer, LGED, Jamalpur
- Dr. Mohammad Dobir U. Sardar, Civil Surgeon, Jamalpur
- Nasreen Jahan, District Women Affairs Officer, Jamalpur
- G.S. Faruk Hossain Patwary, District Food Controller, Jamalpur
- Md. Nurul Azam, UNO, Dewangonj
- Md. Zakir Hossain, UNO, Bakshigonj
- Bilkis Jahan Reeme, UNO, Jamalpur Sadar
- Md. Nuruzzaman, UNO, Madargonj
- Zakaria, UNO, Sarishabari
- Md. Masud Alam Siddique, UNO, Melandoi
- Md. Mochiul Islam, UNO
- Md. Altaf Hossain, Project Implementation Officer, Sarishabari
- Biswanath Chakraborty, Project Implementation Officer, Madargonj
- Md. Nasir Uddin Talukder, Project Implementation Officer, Bakshigonj
- S M Altaf Hossain, Project Implementation Officer, Dewangonj
- Md. Hamidul Haque, Project Implementation Officer, Sadar (Jamalpur)
- Md. Nayeb Ali, Project Implementation Officer
- A. Md. Jalal Uddin, Secretary, Red-Crescent Unit, Jamalpur

***List of officials and others met in Mymensingh***

- Ziaur Rahman Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Mymensingh
- Md. Mofiz Uddin, DRRO
- Md. Delwar Hossain, Executive Engineer, Mymensingh
- Md. Dalil Uddin, Executive Engineer, Road and Highways
- Md. Nurul Islam, District Food Controller
- M. Kamrul Islam, Additional Director, Social Welfare Department
- Mrinal Kanti Biswas, District Co-operative Officer, Mymensingh
- Md. Ikramul Haque Titu, Mayor-in-Charge, Mymensingh Municipality
- Dilkush Jahan, District Women Affairs Officer
- Shaikh Abu Tahid, Assistant Forest Ranger, Mymensingh
- Kazi Akhter Uzzaman, C.S.I, Sadar Court, Mymensingh
- Md. Liaquat Ali Shaikh, Sub Assistant Engineer, Water Development Board, Mymensingh
- Md. Abdul Tareq, Disaster Management Officer, World Vision, Mymensingh
- Munjurul Huda, Assistant Inspector on behalf of district Education Officer
- Md. Atikur Rahman, D.C.S
- BM Bazlur Rahman, Representative, DD, DYD, Mymensingh
- Md. Saidur Rahman, Chief Executive Officer, District Board, Mymensingh
- Md. Mozzammel Hoque, Deputy Director, Agriculture Division
- Dr. Md. Abdul Kuddus, District Livestock Officer
- Syed Arif Azam, District Fisheries Officer, Mymensingh
- Abul Hasan Khan, District Adjutant Ansar, Village Defence Party
- Md. Farid Uddin, Assistant Director, FSO, CD
- Md. Abdul Khair, Assistant Information Officer

- Md. Abdul Awal, UNO, Dhobaura
- Md. Babul Mia, UNO, Fulpur
- Md. Zakir Hossain, UNO, Sadar
- Md. Abul Islam, UNO, Fulbaria
- Howlader Md. Rakibul Bari, UNO, Nandail
- Md. Aatur Rahman, UNO, Haluaghat
- Nasrin Jahan, UNO, Muktagacha
- Sayed Mahabub Khan, UNO, Valuka
- Moloy Chowdhury, UNO, Eshwargonj
- Md. Nazmudh Sadat Salim, UNO, Trishal
- Habibun Nahar, UNO, Gouripur
- Md. Shawkat Ali, UNO, Goffargao
- Md. Abdul Hye, Project Implementation Officer, Fulbaria
- Jhahor lal Das, Project Implementation Officer, Eshorgonj
- S.M. Abdul Latif, Project Implementation Officer, Gourpur
- A.S.M Rawkat Hossain, Project Implementation Officer, Treshal
- Md. Abdus Sobahan, Project Implementation Officer, Sadar
- Md. Anwar Hossain, Project implementation Officer, Sujanagar
- Md. Abdur Razzak, Project Implementation Officer
- A.K.M Khorshed Alam Khan, Project Implementation Officer, Fulpur, Mymensingh
- Shamim Ara Aziz, Project Implementation Officer, Valuka
- Md. Akram Hossain, Project Implementation Officer, Haluaghat
- Md. Habibur Rahman, Project Implementation Officer, Nandail
- Salauddin Belal, The Bangladesh Today
- Ranjan mazumder Sib, BTB
- Md. Sohobor Uddin Khan, Journalist, INB

***List of officials and others met in Sirajgonj***

Md. Ashraf Ali, Deputy Commissioner, Sirajgonj  
 Md. Hasibur Rahman, Deputy Director  
 Md. Delwar Hossain, Deputy Director  
 Md. Zulfikar Haider, DRRO  
 Quazi Monwar Hossain, District Food Controller, Sirajgonj  
 C R Nur E. Alam, Mayor, Sirajgonj Municipality  
 Masudur Rahman, Deputy Director, Social Welfare Department, Sirajgonj  
 Md. Abdul Latif, Assistant General, BCIC, Sirajgonj  
 G M Faruque, Assistant Director, Youth Dev. Department  
 Md. Abdul Mannan, upazila Livestock Officer, Sirajgonj  
 Md. Sajedul Kabir, Administrator, Sonali Bank, Sirajgonj  
 Md. Forhad Hossain, Sub-Assistant Director (in-charge), Fire Service and Civil  
 Hafiza Khanom, District Women Affairs Officer  
 S. A. Mannanm District Adjutant  
 Md. Hossain Shahid, upazila Cooperative Officer  
 Md. Golam Kibria, PC  
 Md. Mizanur Rahman, Chairman, Kalia Haripur  
 Ajit Kumar Biswas  
 S.A Samad Khan, Deputy Director, Bangladesh Rural Development Board  
 Nasir Uddin, UNO, Belkuchi  
 A.S.M Mohiuddin, UNO, Raygonj

Md. Rezaul Karim, UNO, Ullapara  
A.K.M Aminur Rahman, UNO, Kamlakanda  
Md. Musfiqur Rahman, UNO, Sirajgonj Sadar  
Md. Yunus Ali, Project Implementation Officer, Tarash upazila  
Md. Zindar Ali, Project Implementation Officer, Kazipur  
Chitta Ranjan Adhikary, Project Implementation Officer, Sahajadpur  
Md. Shah Alam, Project Implementation Officer, Raygonj  
Md. Azizur Rahman, Secretary, Red Crescent  
S.M. Habibur Islam, Project Manager, NDF, CEDRRP  
Md. Abu Hena Mostafa Kakam, Subdivisional Engineer, Roads and Highways Department, Sirajgonj

***List of officials and others met in Kurigram***

Md. Asaduzzaman, Deputy Commissioner, Kurigram  
Mir Zaharul Islam, Additional District Commissioner General, Kurigram  
Md. Mahfuzur Rahman, Police Super, Kurigram  
Dr. Md. Lutfor Rahman, Civil Surgeon, Kurigram  
Md. Abu Bakar Siddique, Mayor, Kurigram  
Md. Enayet Hossain Molla, Representative, District Food Controller  
Md. Mohoshin Ali, Deputy Director, Agricultural Extension, Kurigram  
Dr. A. M. Shafiuzzaman, Additional Livestock Officer, Kurigram  
Rezaul Mostafa Asafudoulla, Executive Engineer, Bangladesh Water Dev. Board  
Md. Nazmul Hoque, District Marketing Officer, Kurigram  
Md. Abdul Aziz, District Fisheries Officer  
Md. Abdur Rahim, Instructor, Youth Training Academy, Kurigram  
Md. Shahidul Islam Khan, Sub-Assistant Engineer, Road and Highways, Kurigram  
Md. Abdul Rashid, UNO, Ulipur  
Md. Enamul Hoque, UNO, Chilmari  
Md. Moklesur Rahman, UNO, Fulbari  
Md. Sayd Kutub, UNO, Kurigram (Sadar)  
Md. Hamidul Hoque, UNO, Bhurungamari  
Ahmed Kabir, UNO, Nageshari  
S. Amin Khan, UNO, Rajarhat  
K S A Baten, Project Implementation Officer, Bhurungamari  
Md. Mohosinul Haque, Project Implementation Officer, Fulbari  
Md. Rabiul Awal, Project Implementation Officer, Rajarhat  
Md. Abdul Karim, Project Implementation Officer, Kurigram Sadar  
Md. Ziaur Rahman, Project Implementation Officer, Ulipur  
Md. Yunus Ali, Project Implementation Officer, Chilmari  
Md. Zakir Hossain, Project Implementation Officer, Rajibpur  
Md. Atiur Rahman, Project Implementation Officer, Roumari  
Md. Obaid Ullah, Representative, RDRS  
Md. Zobaid Ali Sarker, Administrative Officer, Terre Des Homes (TDH), Kurigram  
Profulla Kumar Roy, Senior Prog. Officer, Solidarity

### **Annex 3. Details of the sampling method used**

Use of simple additive score of food insecurity: (mean 12.05, SD 3.50, and range 0-24)

Expected difference 0.5 at the end of the program

Power 90% (beta 0.1)

Initial sample size calculated: 515

Inter cluster Correlation (ICC) (at union level): 0.08

Strata: Upazila, Area

Design effect: 2.13

Sample: 1097

Final sample considering 10% attrition rate : 1206

Sample from general population : 1809

15 participants and 22 non participants selected from each war

One ward selected from each union and 2 unions from each *upazila*.

Total: 1350 participants and 1980 non-participants from a total of 45 randomly selected *upazilas*.

#### **Example of calculation of sample size for other outcomes**

Per capita per day expenditure of rural areas (mean Tk. 37.38 and SD 30.92)

Expected difference 2.62 at the end of the program

Power 90% (beta 0.1)

Initial sample size calculated: 471

Inter cluster Correlation (ICC) (at union level): 0.058

Strata: Upazila, Area

Design effect: 1.812

Sample: 855

Final sample considering 10% attrition rate : 940

Sample from general population : 1410

**Annex 4. Survey questionnaire**

**Baseline survey 100-Day Employment Generation Programme Evaluation, 2008**

I. Sample status: Member [1] Comparison [2]

II.1 District..... II.2 Upazila.....Code: 

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II.3 Union: ..... II.4. Ward.....

II.5 Village: .....

III. Beneficiary's name:.....Line no: 

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IV. Name of main female of household .....Line no: 

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V. Household head's name.....Line no: 

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VI. Husband/Father of the household head: .....

VII. Enumerator's name... ..Code 

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 \_/\_/\_/\_

VIII. Cross checked by..... Code 

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VIII. If you are a participant of the programme,  
 Date of registration: \_ \_ / \_ \_ / \_ \_  
 Scheduled date to start the work \_ \_ / \_ \_ / \_ \_

**(Interviewers:** Explain the below substance clearly to the respondent and proceed with his/her permission.)  
 You probably know, the Government of Bangladesh has launched a 100-day employment generation programme to provide job to unemployed poor to ensure their food security. BRAC has initiated a research in your area on the impact of the programme. As it is not possible to collect information from everyone, our objective is to select some households randomly. You have been selected through this process. Based on your information we will try to figure out how the programme is working. For this purpose we will ask you about your family members, various income generation activities, wealth, expenditures, etc.

If you agree to provide information, please sign below. You have right to keep away or to quit at anytime if you want. You will not face any penalty or reward for not providing or proving information. Do you agree to provide information?

YES
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NO
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**S1. Demography and Education of household members**

Line no	Name	[ ]'s age		[ ]'s relationship with respondent (See codes: Appendix 1)	[ ]'s sex Male [1] Female [2]	[ ]'s marital status	[ ]'s religion	Members older than 5 years		[ ]'s school-going status (5-25 years old )	Is [ ] currently enjoying benefit from any government programme. (except 100-Day EGP).	If ans to column-12 is yes, tell us the name of the program
		year	month*					Can [ ] read and write letter? Yes [1]; No [0]	highest class completed by [ ]			
	1	2	3	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1												
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14												
15												

\* Mention age in months for children aged less than 5 years.

**Marital Status:**  
 Never married [1];  
 Divorced [2];  
 Married, living with spouse [3];  
 Separated/abandoned [4];  
 Widowed [5]

**Religion:**  
 Islam [1]; Hindu [2]; Buddhist [3];  
 Christian [4];  
 Other, specify [5]

**Class completed:**  
 Less than class 1 [0]; Class one [1];  
 Class two [2]; .....Class 9 [9];  
 SCC/Dakhil [10]; HSC/Alim [11];  
 Graduate/Fazil [12]; MA/Kamil [13];  
 Diploma/ Vocational [14];  
 Hafez [15]

**School going status:**  
 Never attended [1];  
 Currently studying [2];  
 Completed education [3];  
 Will go to school soon [4]

**Type of government programme:**  
 VGD [1]; VGF [2]; RMP [3];  
 Old age allowance [4]  
 Widow allowance [5];  
 Food for Work [6];  
 Others (please specify).....

## S2. Activities of household members

During the year before the start of Ramadan, what business activities have the members above age 5 years of this household been involved in? List up to 3 business activities for each member.

HH Member Line No.	Serial no. of activity	Income related activity codes (see code list-Appendix 1)	For how many days did [ ] do this activity during the last year? (Days)	On a typical working day, how many hours does [ ] spend on this activity? (Hours)	What was the HH's total earnings from this activity during the past year? (in Tk)	Does [ ] have separate, individual earnings from this activity? Yes [1]; No [0]	If yes, what was [ ]'s total individual earnings from this activity during the past year? (in Tk)	Did [ ] have daily income from this activity? Yes [1]; No [0]	Only for activities with daily income		Are there any other business activities that [ ] is involved with? Enter the codes of [ ]'s other activities.
									On a typical working day, how much was your cash earning from this activity	On a typical working day, how much did you earn in kind from this activity (Tk)	
1											
2											
3											
4											

\* Please note: If the respondent is non-Muslim, let her/him know when Ramadan started

**S3.** During the year before the start of Ramadan, did your household get any money from a household non-member living abroad? (If yes write amount in Tk. if no write [0])

**S4.** Did you receive money from any person who is not a household member and living in Bangladesh? (If yes write amount in Tk. if no write [0])

**S5.** During the year prior to Ramadan, did any member of your household migrate out of the village for work (Yes=1; No=0)?

**S6. If the answer to S15 is yes, please describe the activities:**

Line no	Where migrated? (within district=1; Dhaka-Chittagong=2; other districts=3, Gone abroad=4) (multiple codes allowed)	How many days did s/he work?	In which month s/he migrated? (January=1, ... December=12) (multiple codes allowed)	Types of activities (see occupation code list) (multiple codes allowed)
1				
2				
3				

**S 7. Business/Non-business assets**

SL no	Which of the following assets does your household own? (lent /mortgaged one will be included)	Number/amount of assets ( in the case of land write in decimal, for others write number of assets)	Sl no	Which of the following assets does your household own? (lent /mortgaged one will be included)	Number/amount of assets (number)
1	Own land, homestead (decimal)		15	Rickshaw /Van/car	
2	Own land & own cultivation (decimal)		16	Trees ( at least valued Tk. 100	
3	Own land, mortgaged/rented/ other (decimal)		17	Radio/Cassette Player	
4	Own land, others		18	Television	
5	Cows		19	Electric Fan	
6	Goats/ sheep		20	Refrigerator	
7	Chicken /ducks		21	Cellular Phone	
8	Power pump		22	Bicycle	
9	Plough		23	Motorcycle	
10	Tractor		24	Sewing machine	
11	Mowing machine		25	Mosquito net	
12	Shop		26	Jewellery (Tk.)	
13	Boat		27	Ceremonial Sarees	
14	Fishing net		28	Others-----	

**S8. Housing condition**

Sl. No	Question	Code
1.	How many rooms does your household use as a dwelling? (excluding room used for business)	
2.	Main materials of your main house's wall Cement [1]; wood [2]; Mud [3]; Bamboo [4]; other materials [5]	
3.	Does your household have a separate kitchen? Yes [1]; No[0]	
4.	Do you have electricity supply in your house? Yes [1] No [0]	
5.	What type of latrine does your household use? Sanitary [1] kacha latrine [2] open space [3]	

**S9. Where and how much cash savings does this household have? (In Taka, if no savings enter [0])**

Saving at home	Bank/post office/insurance	NGOs	Savings to others (	Others

**S10. Does your household have any outstanding loan?**

Sl no	Sources of borrowing	Whether in cash or in kind? In Cash [1]; In kind [2]	Loan amount (present outstanding (Tk))
1			
2			
3			

**Sources of borrowing:** Bank [1]; Money-lender [2]; Shop-keeper [3]; Relative [4]; Friend/Neighbour [5]; BRAC [6]; Grameen Bank [7]; ASA [8]; TMSS [9]; RDRS [10]; Proshika [11]; Buro Tangail [12]; Padakhep [13]; Swanirvar [14]; Other [15]

**S11. Food Security** for all members in household

Sl no	Question	Answer
1	In the month before the start of Ramadan, how many times did your household members purchase rice? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
2	In the month before the start of Ramadan, how many times has it happened that you could not eat two fulfilling meals in a day? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
3	In the month before the start of Ramadan,, how many days did your household members eat fish/ meet? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
4	In the month before the start of Ramadan,, did your household members take any other food like biscuit, puffed rice, cake between two meals? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
5	In the month before the start of Ramadan,, how many times had it happened that your household could not manage enough food? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
6	In the month before the start of Ramadan,, how many times did it happen that you could not cook because you did not have anything to cook? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
7	In the month before the start of Ramadan,, how many times did your household members eat rice only? (with salt, onions, chili etc.) Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
8	In the month before the start of Ramadan, how many times you have to borrow rice? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1]; 1-2 times a week [2]; 3-4 times a week [3]; More than 5 times a week [4]	
9	Compared to other times, does the type of food/variety of food eaten change during <i>Kartik/chyatra</i> ? No, same as in the other time of the year [0]; Yes, little (quality change only) [1]; Yes, little (change amount only) [2]; Yes, (both type and amount) [3]	
10	To manage food for your family, did any member of your household need to perform any sort of work that make you ashamed? Yes[1] No [0]	
11	What would you say about the status of your household's food availability? Always deficit [1]; Deficit at times [2]; Neither deficit nor surplus [3]; Surplus [4]	

### S12. Crisis/Incidence coping

Crisis/disaster and their solution during the year before the start of Ramadan

Sl no	Events	Has the event occurred during the period mentioned (or six months)? Yes [1] No [0]	If yes, how many months ago?	How much money did you spend /loss?	How did you cope this expenditure / damage? (may be more than one answer code)
	1	2	3	4	5
1	Serious illness of earning member				
2	Serious illness of other member				
3	Crops lost due to any natural disaster				
4	Death of earning member				
5	Death of non earning member				
6	Marriage of household member				
7	House damaged seriously due to any natural disaster excluding river erosion				
8	Loss of home/ homestead land due to river erosion				
9	Loss of other lands due to river erosion				
10	Loss of livestock/poultry due to natural or other disasters, etc				
11	Poisoning/damaging livestock by others				
12	Divorce				
13	Earning member leaving household				
14	Legal case or local conflict				
15	Theft				
16.	Robbery				
17	Others				

#### **How to cope with the crisis/incidence:**

Do nothing [0]; Reduce food expenditure [1]; Reduce other expenditure [2]; Using savings [3]; Asset sale (productive) [4]; Asset sale (non-productive) [5]; Sending child to another household [6]; Sending child (less than 14) to work [7]; Sending previously non-working adult HH member to work [8]; Withdraw child from school [9]; Begging [10]; Borrowing [11]; Sale of advance labour [12]; Relief aid [13]; Transfer from friend/ relative [14]; others [15]

### S13. Expenditure

How much does your household spend for following items

Items	Total expenditure (taka)	Items	Total expenditure (taka)
<b>Expenditure of the month prior to Ramadan</b>			
Rice, wheat, daal		Sugar, oil, salt, spices etc.	
Vegetables, potato etc.		Fruits	
Fish, meat, egg etc.		Other foods (specify) -----	
Fuel		Transportation costs	
Kerosene		Electricity	
Cosmetics		Salary of servant	
Toilet accessories		Others (specify) -----	
Entertainment		-----	
<b>Expenditure during the year prior to Ramadan</b>			
Childrens' clothing (0-10 years old)		Textiles (bed sheets, curtains, etc.)	
Adult Males' clothing		Materials for ritual ceremonies (including marriages, births, deaths, circumcisions etc.)	
Adult females' clothing		Charities (Zakat, Sadka) / Gifts	
Children's' footwear		Dowry	
Adult males' footwear		Legal expenses, e.g. khajna	
Adult females' footwear		Education	
Household utensils		Others (specify)	
Furniture			

#### S14. Factors of participation

	Question	Code
1	Do you or any member of your household have contact with the Chairman of the local Union Council? None [0]; Respondent [1]; Any other member of the HH [2];	
2	If yes, how often do you/other HH member meet the Chairman? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1];1-2 times a week [2];3-4 times a week [3];More than 5 times a week [4]	
3	Do you or any member of your household have contact with the member of the local Union Council? None [0]; Respondent [1]; Any other member of the HH [2];	
4	If yes, how often do you meet the Member? Never [0]; 1-2 times a month [1];1-2 times a week [2];3-4 times a week [3];More than 5 times a week [4]	
5	Is any member of the Union Council a relative of yours (or any other household member)? 1=Yes, close relative 2=Yes, not so close relative; 3=No	
6	If needed, can any member of your household seek for any assistance from union council members? 1=Yes 0=No	
7	Did any member of your household earn by selling physical labour during the last one year prior to Ramadan? 1=Yes 0=No	
8	Did any member of your household participate in any government programme like food for work (excluding 100-Day EGP) 1=Yes 0=No	
9	How long you have been living in this village? (years)	

#### S15. Process of participation and knowledge about programme (to participants only)

	Question	Code
1.	How did you come to know about this programme? Radio/TV=1; Newspaper=2; From a member of the Union Council =3; Local advertisement =4; Someone from the village=5; Others (specify) -----	
2.	How did you join this programme? You requested the ward member=1; Member/chairman themselves selected you=2; With the help of other village elite member =3, Others (specify)	
3	What do you know about this programme? Will create employment opportunity =1; Will provide unemployment benefit=2; Others (specify) (May have multiple response).....	
4	Do you know how this selection process for beneficiaries has been held? Yes=1, No=0	
5	Do you know how the works for this programme have been selected? Yes= 1, No=0	
6	Have you seen the list of names of the possible selected candidates for this programme? Yes=1, No=0	
7	Have you seen the list of the names of the selected beneficiaries? Yes=1, No=0	
8	Did you come to learn about any committee formed to select beneficiaries? Yes=1, No=0	
9	If 'YES', do you know the committee members?(not name ,use the code) 1= Local UP Chairman, 2= Local UP Member, 3= Local female UP Member,4= Other UP Members,5= UP secretary, 6=NGO's,7= Matubbor, 8=	

	Older person, 9=Teacher. 10= Religious person, 11=Relative, Others=mention.	
10	Did you come to know about any meeting held regarding this programme under ward level? Yes=1, No=0	
11	If 'Yes', did you participate? Yes=1, No=0	
12	The selection process of the beneficiaries for this programme has been unbiased. Do you agree? 1= Strongly agree, 2= Agree, 3= Disagree, 4= Strongly disagree	
13	The selection of 'works' under this programme have been appropriate. Do you agree? 1= Strongly agree, 2= Agree, 3= Disagree, 4= Strongly disagree	
14	Under this programme how many members of your family have been benefited? (number)	
15	Did you know that if you were not selected you have the right to complain officially? Yes=1, No=0	
16	If 'Yes', to whom you would have complained? 1= Local UP Chairman, 2= Local UP Member, 3= Local female UP Member,4= Other UP Members,5= UP secretary, 6=NGO's,7= Matubbor, 8= Older person, 9=Teacher. 10= Religious person, 11=Relative, Others=mention.	
17.	How long would you get the benefit from this programme? Correct answer (100 days)=1; Wrong answer =0; Do not know=88.	
18	What is the wage rate offered in this program? (Write in Taka) Correct answer (100 days)=1; Wrong answer =0; Do not know=88.	
19	How much would you get as unemployment benefit? Correct answer (Tk. 40)=1; Wrong answer =0; Do not know=88.	
20	How much would you get as unemployment benefit if you are not provided employment for more than 30 days. Correct answer (Tk. 50) =1; Wrong answer =0; Do not know=88.	
21	During which months you will have to work in this programme? Correct answer =1 (Sept-Nov and Mar-Apr); Wrong answer =0; Do not know=88.	

**S16. Perceived impact (To be asked to the participants only)**

	Question	Answer
1.	How was your income affected by this program? Income increased=1; Neither increased nor decreased=2; Decreased=3	
2.	How was your food intake affected by this program? Improved quality=1; Increased amount=2; Improved quality and quantity=3; No change=4; Reduced quality=5; Decreased amount=6; Reduced quality and quantity=7	
3.	How did the programme affect your overall economic status? Improved=1; Neither improved nor deteriorated=2; Deteriorated =3	
4.	What changes has this programme brought in your social life?	

### S17. Programme Experience

	Question	Code
1	When did the programme start in this area?	
2	When were you scheduled to start work? (date)	
3	When did you actually start the work? (date)	
4	If you did not start the work on the scheduled day, why? Did not know=1; No work available=2; others (specify)	
5	How are you paid: At the end of the day=1; at the end of week=2; others (specify)	
6	Are you paid for the work that you did last week?	
7	How many days did you work till date? (days) Yes=1, No=0	
	If the answer to question 7 is No, why?	
8	Starting from first day of the programme till last week (last week excluded), do you have any payment due? Yes=1, No=0	

### S18. Types of works of last 7 working days

	Type of work Cutting/carrying earth=1; Trash removal=2; Building house etc.=3; Plantation=4; Agricultural work=5; Upgrading stoves=6; Compost pit preparation=7 Others (please specify) ....	Days worked	Hours of work per day (if more than one day, average)	Distance to work (km)	Time required to go to work (mn)
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

### S19. How much do you agree with the statements below?

Serial No	Statements	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
		●	●	●	●	●
1.	In most ways your life is close to your ideal.					
2.	The conditions of your life are excellent.					
3.	You are satisfied with your life.					
4.	So far you have gotten the important things that you wanted in your life.					
5.	If you could live your life over, you would change almost nothing.					

**Palli shomaj**

**S 20.** (Enumerator should collect information himself) **Does this ward have any Pollishomaj?** If YES then fill the below table.

Serial Number	Question	Answer
1	Have you heard about pollishomaj under this ward or do you know about pollishomaj? Yes=1, No=0	
2	Is anyone of your family a member of the pollishomaj? Yes=1, No=0	
3	Is any of the pollishomaj member related to you or your family? Yes=1, No=0	
4	If NO, do you know any of the pollishomaj members? Yes=1, No=0	
5	Did you get any sort help from pollishomaj regarding getting selected in this programme (EGP)? Yes=1, No=0	

**TUP Experience**

**S21.** (Enumerator should collect information himself) **Is this village included in the TUP program?** Yes=1, No=0

Serial Number	Question	Answer
1	Is anyone of your khana listed as a TUP member? Yes=1, No=0,	
2	If 'Yes', Who is he/she? (line no)	
3	Which year he/she was listed as a member?	
4	Under which programme of TUP? 1=STUP I, 2=STUP II, 3= OTUP I, 4=OTUP II.5= STUP (Phase 1)	

**Appendix 1: Relation and occupation code list**

<p><b>Code of relations with the correspondent:</b></p> <p>[1] Respondent                  [2] Husband/wife                  [3] Son/Daughter                  [4] Father/Mother                  [5] Father-in-law/Mother-in-law                  [6] Brother/ Sister                  [7] Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law                  [8] Son-in-law/Daughter-in-law                  [9] Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law                  [10] Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law                  [11] Grandchildren                  [12] Grand parents                  [13] Husbands Grand parents                  [14] Uncle/Aunty                  [15] Uncle-in-law/Aunty-in-law                  [16] Cousin                  [17] Husbands Cousin                  [18] Nephew/Niece                  [19] Husbands nephew/niece                  [20] Housemaid                  [21] Husbands second wife                  Others, please state.</p>	<p><b>Code of occupation:</b></p> <p>[1] House work                  [2] Agriculture                  [3] Agriculture day labour                  [4] Non-agricultural day labour                  [5] Industrial Labour                  [6] Livestock                  [7] Poultry                  [8] Nursery                  [9] Fisherman                  [10] Maid servant                  [11] Processing food for selling                  [12] Handicraft                  [13] Rickshaw/van/driver                  [14] Peddler                  [15] Small business at home                  [16.1] Hotel worker                  [16.1] Owner of hotel/shop                  [17] Big business (Wholesale)                  [18] Skilled labour (goldsmith, mechanic)                  [19] Community Health worker                  [20] Teacher</p>	<p>[21] Doctor/Nurse/Engineer/Lawyer                  [22] Private/NGO officer                  [23] Government official                  [24] Private/NGO staff                  [25] Government staff                  [26] Political leader (member/chairman)                  [27] Imam/Priest                  [28] Student                  [29] Beggar                  [30] Unemployed (looking for job)                  [31] Retired                  [32] Land borrower                  [33] Pos lend to others                  [99] Not applicable                  Others, state please.</p>
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### Annex 5. BRAC qualitative field level interviews

Interviewees	Jamalpur	Kurigram	Kishorgonj	Mymensing	Sirajgonj	Total
Beneficiaries	31	31	40	22	36	<b>160</b>
Villagers	13	16	19	9	19	<b>76</b>
Leaders	2	2	2	2	2	<b>10</b>
UP Members	4	4	4	4	4	<b>20</b>
PIC	3	3	3	3	3	<b>15</b>
UDMC	3	3	3	3	3	<b>15</b>
PIO	1	1	1	1	1	<b>5</b>
SO	1	1	1	1	1	<b>5</b>
UNO	1	1	1	1	1	<b>5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>311</b>

### Annex 6. Determinants of participation: logit regression (regressor =1 if participant)

Explanatory variables	Coefficient	(z stat)
Wealth score from factor analysis	-0.651	(9.32)***
Whether there is any day laborer in the HH	1.414	(14.80)***
Whether any member receives govt. benefit	-0.311	(2.63)***
Owens at least 50 decimal land	-0.885	(5.08)***
There is a close relative in the UP	0.609	(3.06)***
Can communicate with UP chair or member if required	1.907	(8.56)***
Number of working aged members in the HH	0.227	(5.66)***
Female headed household	0.693	(4.49)***
Whether any member goes out of village for work	-0.100	(0.82)
Constant	-3.918	(14.78)***

n= 3332

Pseudo R-square= 0.1888

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

## Annex 7. Comparative analysis of the 100-day EGP and the India National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)

Because many of the reasons for the success or failure of a public works programme can, to significant extent, be embedded in their design, this section sheds light on the main areas of convergence and divergence between the design of the 100-day EGP in Bangladesh as defined by the Implementation Guidelines, and the Indian Rural Employment Guarantee scheme(s) as now framed by the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (Government of India, 2008a)<sup>32</sup>.

While programmes need to be tailored to the local context, the comparison appears relevant because India has a long-standing experience with rural employment schemes and the implementation guidelines laid down in the NREGA consolidate much of this experience. Although the Indian scheme appears more refined than the 100-day EGP, field evidence shows that the implementation performance varies widely between Indian states, depending notably on local planning, implementation and monitoring capacities. An important feature of the NREGA is that it was the power of the People's movement which drove the government to formulate the Act. A key feature is that people get not only guarantee but also the 'right to employment.'

Table A. provides a detailed comparison of the Bangladesh 100-day EGP and the NREGA, along various design features. Below, light is shed on main areas convergence and divergence in the design of the programmes.

**Table A. Comparative analysis of the Bangladesh 100-day EGP and the India Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme/NREGA**

	Bangladesh 100-Day EGP	Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme	India NREGA (2008b)
Objectives	<p>Create employment for rural extreme/unemployed poor; increase purchasing power of extreme poor people affected by price hike; create wealth for people and the nation; develop/maintain small scale infrastructure</p> <p>No linkages with human development (compulsory enrolment in schools etc...)</p>	<p>Initially conceived as a relief programme to overcome the effect of severe droughts</p> <p>Objectives similar to those of NREGA</p> <p>No linkages with human development (compulsory enrolment in schools etc...)</p>	<p>Enhancing the livelihood security of people in rural areas</p> <p>Creating durable assets and strengthening the livelihood resource base of the poor</p> <p>No linkages with human development (compulsory enrolment in schools etc...)</p>

<sup>32</sup> The NREGA is the central Act providing legal guarantee of employment, which the different States of India are expected to implement through framing Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes (REGS), according to the minimum set of rules set forth in the NREGA.

<b>Targeting and coverage</b>	<p>Targeted to capable extreme poor/unskilled unemployed poor</p> <p>No gender target</p> <p>Excludes persons covered by other SSNs</p> <p>Only one capable member of a hh is eligible</p> <p>Age: 18 to 50</p>	<p>Every hh adult member willing to do unskilled manual work on piece-rate basis</p> <p>No restriction on the number of beneficiaries/hh</p>	<p>Every hh adult member willing to do unskilled manual work</p> <p>Gender target: at least 1/3 of employed have to be women</p> <p>More than one member can apply, <i>within the limit of 100-day of work per HH</i></p> <p>No restriction regarding participation in other safety nets</p> <p>Age: Minimum: 18 - No upper age limit/special clause for disabled people</p>
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<b>MAIN FEATURES OF IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN/PROCESS</b>			
<b>Past experience with public rural employment schemes</b>	Limited experience with rural public works/employment programs	Long standing experience with rural employment schemes since Rural Manpower Scheme (1960), Crash Scheme for Rural Employment (1971-72) and Maharashtra programme initiated in 1972; Food for Work Programme (1977) transformed into National Rural Employment Program, Rural Landless Employment Guarantee. National Food for Work Programme (2005)...	
<b>Legal framework</b>	No statutory work guarantee	Statutory basis given in 1977, effective in 1979, emphasizing the right to work and guaranteed employment	Scheme backed by Parliament NREG Act emphasizing the right to work and guaranteed employment  (Related institutional setting: Central Employment Guarantee Council and State Employment Guarantee Councils + National Employment Guarantee Fund)
<b>Funding/ budgetary allocations</b>	Budgetary allocations/resource transfer fixed within the limits of the funds earmarked for the project in the national budget  Government also bears administrative expenses	Funding sources: Tax levies specific to the scheme * plus matching contribution from state government  * 50% from taxes on the urban population including taxes on professionals, formal sector employees; motor vehicles; surcharge on sales tax, land revenue, tax on no residential urban land buildings  Supply driven: Planning Department makes budgetary provisions and releases quarterly credit limits to Districts	Budgetary allocations/resource transfers are demand driven  Central Government bears entire wage costs of projects for unskilled workers; 75% for semi skilled and skilled as well as administrative expenses, including of National Employment Guarantee Council  States bear 25% cost of material & wages for semi-skilled and skilled workers; unemployment allowance; administrative expenses (State EG Council)  The release of funds is based on project appraisal
<b>Implementation approach</b>	Nationwide: 64 districts, 480 upazilas, in two phases, corresponding to lean periods.  Some adjustments are planned in the second phase, based on implementation experience in the first phase	Phased-in approach: initiated as a pilot Integrated Area Development Scheme in 1965 restricted to one district and thereafter extended to 11 districts (1970) and then to all rural areas in 1972	Phased-in (Pilot Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme introduced in 1972) Act notified in 2005 to cover whole country by 2010: Phase 1 (200 districts) - 2006; phase 2 (130 districts in 2007-08.), others from April 2008 onward

<b>Implementation period</b>	100 days during lean seasons (mid September end November) and March-April  But EGP can be launched at any time in case of natural disasters	100 days per hh at any time throughout the year  Employment rates through the schemes are actually found higher during lean seasons	100 days per hh at any time throughout the year
<b>Institutional setting</b>	Four tier set up consisting of Central Government/District/upazila and Union Parishad level institutions	Multi-tier set-up consisting of planning direction and coordination committees at State (Planning Department), District (Collector) and Panchayat Samiti (Block council) levels	Multi-tier set-up of Central Government; State District Panchayat, District Programme Officer; Intermediary Panchayat, Block Programme Officer; Gram Panchayat  Gram Panchayat have to execute 50% of works
<b>SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES AND WORKS</b>			
<b>Selection / registration of beneficiaries</b>	Consultations with stakeholders at union level for identifying beneficiaries to be approved at upazila level by UNO within the limits (number of beneficiaries) set by the Ministry; approved list of beneficiaries released in open-ward meeting	Interested individuals register with village authority and provide demand for work	Interested households have to apply for registration to local Gram Panchayat which issues job cards to the hh (registration has to be done once every 5 years)  Adult members of the hh have to submit written applications to local Gram Panchayat, each time work is sought (applications specify time and duration of work sought, with a minimum of 15 days)  Applications can be submitted in advance, in group, for different periods of the year when work is sought  Applicants have to accept any work given by Gram Panchayat  Hh job cards, which carry photographs of applicants, record the number of days a person has worked, wage received, unemployment allowances received etc...

Types/ selection of works	<p>Type of works:  - preparation of compost heap for cultivated land, repair of house affected by natural calamities, road/barrage construction; pond/canal excavation; afforestation and vegetable grass cultivation on Government land; canal irrigation/construction for removing water logging; removal of sweeping and waste materials  - Other agricultural production activities , as approved by the MoFDM/ National Steering Committee  - Relevant existing under-funded projects of Government agencies may be covered under the EGP</p> <p>Identification/Planning:  Participatory identification of works by Union Parishad – Ward members) based on consultation with stakeholders; final list of works ultimately approved by UNO</p> <p>Selection criteria: Work proposals have to be consistent with list provided in the Guidelines; no minimum labour requirements and or minimum labour intensity ratio; more than one project can be taken in one area</p>	<p>Type of works: Proposals have to be consistent with priority list of works established by the State: initially drought-proofing (irrigation, soil conservation, land development and afforestation)</p> <p>Provision of employment (ST) and strengthening of rural infrastructure (LT) – now linked to Village Development and horticulture and wells construction programs</p> <p>Identification/Planning:  Selection of shelf of projects by District based on Gram Panchayat priorities.</p> <p>Selection criteria: for the labour intensity, the ratio of cost of unskilled labour to equipment/materials and supervision charges must be equal or above 51:49; minimum labour requirement: 50 labourers</p>	<p>Type of works: water conservation and harvesting, drought proofing (afforestation, tree planting); irrigation facilities for hhs belonging to ‘scheduled castes or scheduled tribes’, renovation of traditional water bodies, land development, flood control, rural connectivity (all-weather roads); any other work notified by Central Government.</p> <p>Identification Planning:  Preparation of an annual plan for the village by each Gram Panchayat, in consultation with Gram Sabhas, which are ultimately consolidated and approved at District level; work proposals to be made by implementing agencies (in most cases Gram Panchayat, but can be district panchayats, public works, forest and irrigation departments) as designated by States or the Central Government</p> <p>Approved list of works (as per approved Block plan) indicates for each work costs, timeframe, man-days to be generated and implementing agencies</p> <p>Selection Criteria: Work proposals to be consistent with list of permissible works under the Act (Water conservation, Drought Proofing plantation &amp; afforestation); flood protection; land development, minor irrigation, horticulture, and land development of SC/BPL/minorities; land reform beneficiaries; rural connectivity; wage material ratio: 60:40</p>
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Allocation and implementation of works	<p>Works have to be completed within 90 and 60 days of receiving the first and second allocations of funds</p> <p>Allotment: UNO supervising officer publicly declare list of projects/capable persons in open ward meeting</p> <p>Project Implementation Committees, formed by Union Committees are responsible for execution of all projects</p> <p>Relevant government agencies are to provide technical assistance</p>	<p>Projects cannot be activated if interfering with other normal agricultural activities or if work available on other public works</p>	<p>Timeframe is specific to each work approved</p> <p>Allotment: Works allocated to any applicants by Gram Panchayat and Block Implementation officer; Priority is given to 'old works' within the plan; new works initiated only if there are at least 10 labourers (formerly 50)</p>
Capacity building support	<p>Guidelines do not contain any such provisions</p>	<p>NA</p>	<p>Central Government supports administrative expenses (up to 4% of total cost) earmarked for personal deployment</p> <p>Training of stakeholders at all levels (officials, PRIs, Local Vigilance Committees)</p>
<b>SOCIAL BENEFITS</b>			
Wage setting and disbursement	<p>Fixed, unique wage of 100 Taka/day/person as set by the Govt (assumed to be below market rates)</p> <p>Wages are income tax/VAT free</p> <p>To be disbursed on daily basis</p> <p>Payment by Union Committee through government schedule bank at upazila level</p>	<p>Minimum wage rates for agriculture as applicable in each rural zone covered by the program</p> <p>To be disbursed on weekly basis/not beyond fortnight</p> <p>Piece rates fixed so as that seven hours of work a day = minimum wage</p>	<p>Minimum wage rates for agricultural labourers, as set in the Minimum Wages Act (1948) – not less than 60Rs/day</p> <p>Wages can be paid in cash or kind (foodgrain), but 25% at least in cash</p> <p>Paid on weekly basis, not later than a fortnight after completion of the work.</p> <p>Wages calculated on daily basis (for 7 hours of work) or equivalent piece rate basis</p>
Guarantee mechanisms	<p>Job to be provided within 15 days of registration/issue of card, but no legal guarantee</p>	<p>Job to be provided within 15 day from receipt from demand for work</p>	<p>Job to be provided by Gram Panchayat within 15 days from application receipt date, as stated by the Act</p>

Unemployment allowance	<p>Eligibility: 15 days after registration if no employment provided</p> <p>Amount: 40Tk first 30 days/ 50Tk day for remaining period</p> <p>Payment by Union Committee through government schedule bank at upazila level</p> <p>Conditionality: Payment stopped if work can be made available; allowance not given, if applicant is absent from works for which he registered or gets jobs in other place</p>	<p>Eligibility: If no employment is provided within 15 days after submission of application</p> <p>Amount: NA</p>	<p>Eligibility: If no employment is provided within 15 days after submission of application</p> <p>Amount: no less than one-fourth of the wage rate for the first 30 days after a person becomes eligible for unemployment allowance, and no less than one-half of the wage after that.</p> <p>Conditionality: Applicants have to report for work within 15 days of being informed by GP that work is available, if not, unemployment allowance will not be paid; not applicable if time period for which work is sought is over; hh has exhausted the limit of 100 days of work; to be paid by the States (but provisions of NREGA are vague)</p>
Provision of work site facilities and other social	Not specified	<i>Ex gratia</i> payment of 10,000 Rs in case of death or disablement of worker	Mandatory provision of facilities such as crèche, drinking water, shade for children; entitlement to free medical treatment for injury, payments to legal heirs of deceased/disabled workers; a person may be entrusted (and paid by the program) if more than 5 children are brought on work sites with their parents
Physical access to job	No limit distance to work sites	NA	Work to be provided within 5km of the village, if not, wage premium of 10%
<b>COMMUNICATION, MONITORING &amp; EVALUATION, AUDITING</b>			
Communication process	Notice for registration 'may be hanged in open space'; Union supervising officer nominated by UNO declare list of projects and capable persons in open-ward meeting in presence of beneficiaries		Various Information Educational and Communication Strategies; Gram Sabha are to communicate key features of the Act.

<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">Monitoring and financial auditing</p>	<p>Monitoring responsibilities: upazila Disaster Management Committee, District committees, National Steering Committee</p> <p>Processes: Monthly progress reports at upazila and district level</p> <p>Independent evaluations of programme Phase I and II to be organized</p> <p>Audit: Generic provision that ‘the government will take necessary arrangement for auditing the programme in consultation with Controller and Auditor General’</p>	<p>Monitoring responsibilities: NA</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation processes: extensive, including unscheduled field visits, vigilance tours by officials, supervisions by nonofficial statutory committees</p>	<p>Institutions and Processes National Level Monitors which follow Guidelines Special Monitoring Scheme by National Level Monitors</p> <p>Local Monitoring and Vigilance Committees; Independent monitors ; programme reviews by Ministry of Rural Development; Regional Performance Review Committees</p> <p>Audit: Financial audit is mandatory and must be carried out by each district at the end of the final year either by local fund auditors or chartered accounts</p>
<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">Transparency/ public disclosure/ accountability</p>	<p>Guidelines available on the internet; Monitoring sheet available (indicating disbursement, works finished etc) available on the internet.</p> <p>Implementation guidelines do not contain specific provisions regarding public disclosure of monitoring information.</p> <p>Grievance Redressal: District Committee responsible for grievance redressal; no clear mechanism</p>		<p>People can ask for copies of all records and accounts, as well as muster rolls</p> <p>Implementation followed-up by NGOs and independent groups</p> <p>On-line access to monitoring information;</p> <p>Annual Reports on outcomes to the Parliament</p> <p>Grievance redressal: District programme coordinator is responsible for disposal of grievances – setting up of grievance redressal cells at programme offices; possibly free Help lines; grievances are to be reviewed on a monthly basis and people informed</p> <p>Social Audit: NREGA provides for social audits by Gram Sabha in partnerships with CSOs, with particular focus on works, muster rolls and records</p>


### Areas of convergence

- ❖ **Objectives:** The objectives of the 100-day EGP and the Indian NREGA are quite similar in essence, emphasizing employment provision for poor and vulnerable people linked to


rural infrastructure development. However, because the 100-day EGP is essentially conceived as a short term, time-bound intervention, the programme also intends to address immediate issues such as the loss of purchasing power due to the food price crisis. This is also reflected in the type of works considered as seen below.

- ❖ **Type of works/selection of works:** The range of works proposed under the 100-day EGP is quite similar in nature to that suggested in the NREGA. In both cases, agricultural disaster mitigation/flood control; removal of water logging, irrigation, rural connectivity are priority areas. However, works eligible in the Indian case are ‘long-term development’ oriented (see Table A), while some of the works foreseen under the 100-EGP guidelines are more short term in their focus (e.g. repair of houses affected by natural calamities, preparation of compost heaps). Moreover, in both cases, the list of works/work areas established is tentative and not exhaustive, and may include other activities, as approved by relevant authorities. In both cases, the selection of works follows a bottom-up/top down process (see Figure A and Figure B).

**Figure A. Selection of works, 100 Day EGP**



**Figure B. Selection/Implementation of works, India NREGA**



- ❖ **Employment/unemployment provisions:** In both schemes, beneficiaries can only avail of 100 days of work, provision of employment to card holders shall be within 15 days from registration/applications, and an unemployment allowance is to be provided, under certain conditions, if this deadline cannot be met.
- ❖ **Wage and unemployment allowances:** The 100-day EGP Guidelines fix the unemployment allowance at 40Tk for the first 30 days to be increased to 50Tk day for remaining period. This progressive feature also exists in the Indian scheme, where the allowance is to be no less than one-fourth of the wage rate for the first 30 days after a person becomes eligible for unemployment allowance, and no less than one-half of the wage after that. However, the Indian scheme floor- allowance rate during the first 30 days represents a lower share of wage rate (25%) than in the Bangladesh programme (40%).
- ❖ **Responsibilities:** In both cases, there is a high degree of devolution of key implementation responsibilities at local level (Union level in Bangladesh, Gram Panchayat level in India).

### Areas of divergence

- ❖ **Employment Generation vs. Employment Guarantee:** The Indian State Employment Guarantee schemes are backed by a Parliament Act, the NREGA. Although this is no guarantee of effective delivery, this is however a major breakthrough towards empowering the poor, and holding the government fully accountable for delivery. As an Act of Parliament, the NREGA confers statutory rights and is less prone to short term changes as a project or programme can be. The Act has come after many years during which rural employment guarantee schemes were run as programs without statutory basis.
- ❖ **Time-bound vs. open-ended:** The 100-day EGP in Bangladesh is time-bound with two phases corresponding to the lean seasons (September to November and March to April), while the Indian scheme can be implemented throughout the year. Although the Indian scheme is not restricted to lean periods, there is evidence that employment generation through the scheme is typically higher during lean periods. Overall, the Indian scheme provides greater flexibility for instance in terms of adapting works to climatic conditions. The 100-day EGP Guidelines do provide for some flexibility regarding the starting date of the programs depending on local demand and area-wise working pattern with a 15 day margin. Also, it is stated that this programme can be launched at any time in case of natural disasters.
- ❖ **Immediately nationwide vs. gradual approach:** The rapid nation-wide rolling-out of the 100-day EGP was dictated by the pressures arising from the food price crisis. Experience and lessons learned with the implementation of the first phase of the programme are expected to feed into possible revisions for the second phase. In contrast, the NREGA and related State Schemes build upon the pilot Maharashtra state experience (which dates back to the early 1970s), which itself followed a gradual approach. This approach allowed learning from experience before scaling-up. Piloted first in the poorest districts, the NREGA programme now covers 330 districts, or about two thirds of all Indian districts.
- ❖ **Individual vs. household coverage:** The ‘beneficiary unit’ in India is the household, while in Bangladesh it is the selected household member. Under the 100-day EGP, only one member per household can apply. Under the NREGA, the 100 days employment quota applies to the whole household, which means that, while one more than one member can apply, the combined days of employment should not exceed 100 days in the

financial year. In contrast to the 100-day EGP where only individuals aged between 18 and 50 are eligible, the NREGA does not fix an upper age limit, and does not exclude individuals benefiting from other safety nets.


- ❖ **Supply vs. demand-driven:** A major difference in the design of the two schemes is that the former is largely supply driven while the latter is in essence demand driven.

- *Administrative targeting vs. self-targeting:*


The EGP intends to target extreme /unemployed unskilled poor rural households, while the NREGA, and formerly, the Maharashtra scheme, guarantees wage employment within a programme district to every rural household with adult members willing to work as casual labour at the minimum wage. The Indian scheme does however, have some element of administrative targeting in that it requires that one third of individuals employed under the scheme be women.

The Indian scheme is based on self-selection and individual applications, with the assumption that only the poorest will be interested in manual work for low wages (Figure C). In Bangladesh, the identification of beneficiaries follows a multi-step approach involving both top-down and bottom-up processes (Figure D). While the selection process is foreseen to involve consultations at the Union level both at the identification stage and final enlistment stage (through open-ward meetings), final decisions regarding the list of beneficiaries and registrations largely lie with upazila authorities.

**Figure C. India Registration and application process (NREGA)**



**Figure D. Selection of beneficiaries – 100- day EGP**



Administrative targeting, as in the 100-day EGP, typically entails significant risks of inclusion or exclusion errors -depending notably on the extent of consultations held at the grass-root level. However, although the Indian scheme is self-targeted, the effectiveness with which the scheme reaches the poor also depends to some extent on public administration practices, since households have first to register with the Gram Panchayat for job cards, and interested adult members then have to apply for a job. The targeting effectiveness of the programme also depends on how the minimum wages allocated compare with market rates: the effectiveness will be higher if wages are set low compared to market rates. Conversely, there is an element of self-selection in the 100-day EGP in the sense that, once selected, beneficiaries then have to apply for registration and may choose not to participate in the programme.

Critically, the selection process in Bangladesh is subject to a major supply constraint (rationing) arising from the number of cards issued by the Government, a choice based on upazila-wise extreme poverty mapping.

*- Limited vs. unlimited funding*

Under the 100-day EGP, funds earmarked in the programme budget are allocated by the Government based on the number of beneficiaries fixed for each upazila under the District. In the Indian scheme, funds are allocated by the Central government according to programme needs. While in the Bangladesh scheme, the fund supply constraint entails rationing and exclusion of eligible people, the open-endedness of the schemes under the Indian NREGA can place high strains on public finance and make cost control more difficult.

*- Fixed vs. tailored work time frame*

The 100-day EGP specifies a time limit for the completion of all works, based on a disbursement schedule – 90 days from the first disbursement date and within 60 days from the second disbursements; in the Indian scheme, the timeframe is set separately for each work.

- ❖ **Union-level list of works vs. village up to District level annual planning:** In the Indian scheme the list of works are established based on annual plans prepared at village level by Gram Panchayat which use estimates of local demand for labour and public work priorities for a given fiscal year, in consultation with Gram Sabhas. These are consolidated in annual plans at the Intermediary Panchayat and district levels. While work proposals are to be identified at the Union level- ward via stakeholders' consultations, no such sophisticated planning exercise is foreseen in the 100-day EGP.
- ❖ **Implementation capacity building support:** The Indian scheme provides for training workshops for stakeholders at all levels in order to boost implementation effectiveness. While there is no equivalent provision in the 100-day EGP design, it should be noted that a month into the programme, funding has been approved to hold a number of workshops where such District Commissioners and UNOs will have to attend prior to the second phase. The position of the programme and the different experiences will be discussed on such occasion.
- ❖ **Fixed national wage rates vs. regional wage rates:** The wage set in the 100-day EGP is 100Tk/day per work day. The Indian NREGA provides for setting wage at the minimum wages set for different zones as defined by the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, with a floor rate of 60Rs/day.

As experienced with the pilot Maharashtra scheme, wage levels are an essential element of such self-targeted programs, because higher wages reduce the self-selection feature of

the scheme and provide incentives to non-poor households to participate. Moreover, high wages may deter employment generation by driving up wages on private labour markets. Conversely, wage rates that are too low deter even the poorest from joining the programme.

- ❖ **Access to basic services:** The NREGA has a number of built-in ‘social security’ elements. This includes mandatory provision of a wide range of on-site facilities (such as a crèche, access to safe water, and shade for children); workers are also entitled to free medical treatment and payments to legal heirs in case of disability/death due to work. Furthermore, the Indian scheme authorizes a wage premium of 10% if work cannot be provided within five kilometres of the village. The 100-day ERG has not developed any such elements. In case of disability arising from participation in the programme, the assumption is that other safety nets will kick in to cover the affected person.
- ❖ **Information and communication:** The 100-day EGP did not foresee a communication strategy regarding the programme informing the population about entitlements and implementation procedures. The Indian scheme, in contrast, resorts to a number of information educational and communication strategies, including newspapers, TV, radio spots, pamphlets, etc. Gram Sabhas are responsible for communicating the key features of the Act. In fact, the monitoring of the effectiveness of the communication strategies (awareness-raising activities at grass root level) is embedded in the Guidelines for National Level Monitors.
- ❖ **Transparency and accountability:** Transparency is embedded in the Indian NREGA, with implementation to be scrutinized by independent monitors and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Information on the programme (documents, records etc...) is openly accessible. The programme can also be monitored online. For every project, there is a provision for establishing local-level independent vigilance committees. The scheme provides for social audits by the Gram Sabha. Accountability is further encouraged by the provision that an Annual Report on the implementation of the NREGA be presented to the Parliament by the Central Government. For the 100-day EGP, efforts have been made to make the process transparent: the Guidelines have been posted on the internet as well as some progress indicators at the end of the first phase.

## Annex 8. Daily achievement report

Sl	District	registered benef	projects identified	projects started	money allocated for this	# of upazillas	# of upazillas where work has started	# of unions	# of unions where work has started	Total labourer			total person days			unemployment allowance	total expenditure	total money unspent	# of project ended	% achieved
										female	male	total	female	male	total person days					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1	Dhaka																			
2	Narayangonj																			
3	Munshigonj																			
4	Narshingdi																			
5	Manikgonj																			
6	Gazipur																			
7	Mymensingh																			
8	Kishoregonj																			
9	Jamalpur																			
10	Sherpur																			
11	Netrokona																			
12	Tangail																			
13	Faridpur																			
14	Madaripur																			
15	Shariatpur																			
16	Rajbari																			
17	Gopalganj																			
18	Chittagong																			
19	Cox's Bazar																			
20	Rangamati																			
21	Bandarban																			
22	Khagrachari																			
23	Noakhali																			
24	Feni																			
25	Laxmipur																			
26	Comilla																			
27	Chandpur																			
28	Brahmanbaria																			
29	Sylhet																			
30	Sunamgonj																			
31	Hobigonj																			
32	Moulavibazar																			
33	Khulna																			
34	Satkhira																			
35	Bagerhat																			
36	Jessore																			
37	Magura																			
38	Jhainadah																			
39	Norail																			
40	Kustia																			
41	Meherpur																			
42	Chuadanga																			
43	Barisal																			
44	Jhalakhati																			
45	Bhola																			
46	Pirojpur																			
47	Patuakhali																			
48	Barguna																			
49	Rajshahi																			
50	Nababgonj																			
51	Natore																			
52	Naogaon																			
53	Pabna																			
54	Sirajgonj																			
55	Bogra																			
56	Joypurhat																			
57	Dinajpur																			
58	Panchagarh																			
59	Thakurgaon																			
60	Rangpur																			
61	Kurigram																			
62	Nilphamari																			
63	Lalmonirhat																			
64	Gaibandha																			
	<b>Total</b>																			

% of projects started so far

% of money spent so far out of phase 1 budget

total number of beneficiaries registered

total number of labour days scheduled for 1st phase

% of days worked out of person days schedules for for pahse 1

% of days since beginning of project

% achievement in 64 districts

% registered beneficiaries with respect to target

% female of total employed labourers

% male of total employed labourers



NFPCSP is jointly implemented by the Government of Bangladesh and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, with the financial support of the EC and USAID. The NFPCSP was initiated to enhance national capacity to implement the National Food Policy and its ensuing Plan of Action. This project is designed to support food security related initiatives of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), strengthen the capacity of the Government to plan, monitor and implement the broadened policies, facilitate interministerial collaboration and build stronger links between the Government and civil society.



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